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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly twenty years ago, Jan Paulsson, a leading authority on in-
ternational arbitration, wondered what might become of inves-
tor–state arbitration.1  “Arbitration without privity,” as he termed it,
was radically different from that which had come before and could ei-
ther remain a “marginal feature” of international arbitration or “pre-
sage an epochal extension of compulsory arbitral jurisdiction over
States”—only time would tell.2  When he wrote those words in 1995,
there were close to 900 bilateral investment treaties (BITs)—not an
insignificant number—but investors had initiated fewer than thirty-
five investor–state arbitrations in the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID).3  Now, as investors have more
widely come to realize the power they hold, Paulsson’s second possibil-
ity has evidently come to fruition.  There are now nearly 3,000 BITs in
force, and investors have initiated close to 500 ICSID arbitrations.4
The year 2012 was a record one both in terms of the number of new
investor–state disputes filed, fifty-eight, and the size of a single
award, U.S. $1.77 billion (U.S. $2.3 billion with interest), against the
Republic of Ecuador.5
1. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 257 (1995).  As
Paulsson uses the phrase, “arbitration without privity” is arbitration in the ab-
sence of a contract between the parties containing their consent to arbitration.
States commonly consent to investor–state arbitration in their BITs, but may
also do so in a contract with the investor or in national legislation. RUDOLF
DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
238 (2008). See also S. Pac. Props. (Middle E.) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt,
(ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3), Decision on Jurisdiction II, ¶¶ 89–101 (Apr. 14,
1988), 3 ICSID Rep. 1131 (1995) (finding that Egypt had consented to ICSID ju-
risdiction in national legislation).
2. Paulsson, supra note 1, at 256.
3. List of Concluded Cases, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, https://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&action
Val=ListConcluded (last updated Oct. 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/TWN9-3BS6;  List of Pending Cases, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DIS-
PUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCase
DtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (last updated Oct. 11, 2014), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/K7B5-QRY8.
4. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s
(UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2014, there were 2,902 BITs and 334 other
international agreements containing investment protection provisions by the end
of 2013. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2014: INVESTING IN THE SDGS: AN ACTION PLAN, at 114, UN Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2014, U.N. Sales No. E.14.II.D.1 (2014) [hereinafter UNCTAD
WIR 2014]; List of Concluded cases, supra note 3, List of Pending Cases, supra
note 3.  An unknown number of additional investment arbitrations have been fa-
cilitated by other institutions, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration, or ad
hoc.  According to UNCTAD, 568 known investor–state disputes had been filed in
various forums by the end of 2013. UNCTAD WIR 2014, supra, at 124.
5. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/
11, Award, ¶ 876 (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
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The precipitous development of the investment treaty arbitration
machine is not unlike a freight train barreling down a steep and
treacherous hill.  The BIT phenomenon gained momentum rapidly in
the 1990s, fueled by globalization and a loss of alternatives to foreign
investment as a source of capital.6  In the absence of a multilateral
agreement on investment, states hurriedly jumped on the BIT train—
a club of sorts—to protect investments made by their own nationals in
foreign states, to attract inward foreign investment, or both.7  Like the
barreling freight train, the speed with which states moved involves a
tradeoff; they jumped on board and covered an impressive amount of
ground in a remarkably short period of time, but not in the most con-
trolled fashion and with considerable uncertainty as to what lay
ahead.  Paulsson mused in 1995 that many states did not appreciate
the full implications of the obligations they had assumed.8  Now that
states’ journey on the BIT train has taken a troubling turn, the re-
markable truth of that statement is indubitable.  States are increas-
ingly trying to regain control of the train through various steering
mechanisms, including amending their BITs and issuing interpretive
statements.  Some states have denounced the Convention on the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States (ICSID Convention), and a number have terminated one
or more of their BITs and appear to want to jump from the train alto-
gether.9  In contrast to the steady uptick in investors’ utilization of
documents/italaw1094.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/DCN4-2TYB (a peti-
tion to annul the award was pending as of the date of this Article, and enforce-
ment of the award had been stayed pending the annulment decision); United
Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., IIA Issues Note: Recent Developments in
Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), at 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/
PCB/2013/3 (May 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/46YX-M5CG [hereinaf-
ter IIA Issues Note: Recent Developments]; List of Concluded Cases, supra note 3;
List of Pending Cases, supra note 3.
6. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agree-
ments, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 177–78 (2005). See also Jeswald W.
Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 75–79
(2005) (suggesting lack of other financial assistance led developing countries to
sign BITs in hopes of promoting foreign investment).
7. Paulsson remarked that a multilateral agreement on investment, which was then
being drafted by an OECD working group, “may be the next great advance” in the
field.  Paulsson, supra note 1, at 256–57.  The considerable efforts to negotiate
such an agreement were ultimately unsuccessful. See Charles H. Brower, II, The
Functions and Limits of Arbitration and Judicial Settlement Under Private and
Public International Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 259, 306–07 (2008).
8. Paulsson, supra note 1, at 257.
9. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
Pursuant to Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, Venezuela’s denunciation be-
came effective on July 25, 2012, six months from the date of its notice. Venezuela
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investor–state arbitration, states appear to be concluding BITs at a
declining rate.  Although some level of saturation and an increased
interest in regional trade and investment agreements (as opposed to
bilateral, investment-specific treaties) are likely factors in the com-
paratively low rate at which new BITs are being concluded, it is nota-
ble that states concluded fewer new BITs in 2012 than they had in any
of the preceding twenty-five years.10
The broadest goal of modern international investment law is one
that is very familiar to international lawyers—it is to dethrone power
and crown law as the ruler of the game.  The regime seeks to prevent
states from relying, as the powerful ones occasionally did in the past,
on “gunboat diplomacy” to settle international investment disputes.11
It does this principally through the aforementioned BITs and other
international investment agreements (IIAs), in which states agree to
afford various substantive standards of treatment to investments
made by each other’s nationals—such as fair and equitable treat-
ment—as well as to arbitrate treaty disputes brought by those nation-
Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, INT’L CTR. FOR SET-
TLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES (Jan. 26, 2012), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=An
nouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement
100, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3T79-L8PP.  Bolivia and Ecuador submit-
ted Article 71 notices in 2007 and 2009, respectively. Bolivia Submits a Notice
Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPUTES (May 16, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&From
Page=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3, archived at http://perma.unl.
edu/YRK3-N4LT; Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Con-
vention, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES (July 9, 2009), http://ic-
sid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=Open
Page&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName
=Announcement20, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/F5RZ-WJDC.
10. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
2013: GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT, at 101,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2013, U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.D.5 (2013) [hereinafter
UNCTAD WIR 2013]. Related to the regional trend, the European Union’s (EU)
recently attained exclusive competence over foreign direct investment is un-
doubtedly a factor in the slowdown.  Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
207(1), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].  Pursu-
ant to Council Regulation 1219/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 40 (EU), the European
Commission plans to eventually replace all of the approximately 1200 BITs that
EU Member States concluded with EU-wide investment agreements. See also
European Comm’n, EU Takes Key Step to Provide Legal Certainty for Investors
Outside Europe, EUR. UNION (Dec. 12, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-12-1362_en.htm, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/MEG2-4DXF (sum-
marizing the significant impact of Council Regulation 1219/2012).
11. Jose´ E. Alvarez, Contemporary Foreign Investment Law: An “Empire of Law” or
the “Law of Empire”?, 60 ALA. L. REV. 943, 971 (2009).
2014] EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 317
als (hence the lack of privity).12  The idea is to provide a neutral
alternative to host state courts, which might be biased against foreign
investors, and a law-based alternative to diplomatic espousal, which
requires the injured national’s state to assume the investor’s claim
and pursue it through diplomatic channels.13  The goal is often de-
scribed as the “depoliticization” of international investment disputes,
but it could just as accurately be described as the “legalization” of the
disputes—law is to supplant politics, of course.14
Despite its international character, investment law is similar to
many systems of domestic administrative law in that it requires gov-
ernmental actors to adhere to certain standards of conduct in their
dealings with private parties, and creates a private right of action as a
means of enforcement.  The private right of action is a significant pro-
tection for the private parties, but it also gives rise to a material con-
cern.  As a practical matter, both systems enable private parties to
challenge governmental action that may lie at the heart of a state’s
sovereignty, such as domestic health, safety, and environmental mea-
sures.  Given the similarities between the systems and the more devel-
oped status of the latter, recent comparative work has explored how
principles from the latter might be usefully adapted to the former.15
This Article builds upon that work in light of a fundamental difference
between domestic administrative judicial review and investment
treaty arbitration.  Specifically, and as discussed in more detail below,
whereas national courts serve as a check on national agents in Ameri-
can administrative law, investment arbitration tribunals are the
agents in international investment law.  Further, they are not subject
12. BIT provisions promising to afford fair and equitable treatment and to refrain
from arbitrary or discriminatory measures are among the most frequently in-
voked in investor–state arbitration. See Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable
Treatment, in PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS THROUGH MODERN TREATY
ARBITRATION: DIVERSITY AND HARMONISATION 125 (Anne K. Hoffmann ed., 2010);
Christoph Schreuer, Protection Against Arbitrary or Discriminatory Measures, in
THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 183, 183–98 (Catherine A. Rogers &
Roger P. Alford eds., 2009).
13. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 160.
14. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes:
The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV. 1 (1986).
15. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (Ste-
phan W. Schill ed., 2010); William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Pri-
vate Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor–State
Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283 (2010); Anna T. Katselas, Do Investment
Treaties Prescribe a Deferential Standard of Review?, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L . 87,
92–120 (2012); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005);
Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species
of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121 (2006); Jason Webb Yackee,
Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 391
(2012).
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to any check comparable to national judicial review.  Because interna-
tional investment tribunals do not operate within a tripartite power
structure, that familiar mechanism is unavailable as a means of con-
trolling them.16
Accordingly, while I and others have sought to illustrate that in-
vestment arbitration tribunals could beneficially adapt and apply va-
rious limiting principles drawn from domestic administrative judicial
review, it is worthwhile to also consider the control problem from a
different vantage point.17  Specifically, it is useful to go beyond analy-
sis of what the tribunals can do to guard against exceeding the bounds
of their delegated authority to perpend states’ abilities and responsi-
bilities in this regard.  In this vein, Jason Yackee has usefully analo-
gized investment arbitration tribunals to domestic administrative
tribunals, one component of a broader investment law agency created
by states.18  This Article similarly focuses on states as principals, but
views the delegation of authority through a different lens.  Rather
than an expert administrative agency analogue, the investment arbi-
tration machine is viewed here as an intergovernmental organization
or club.  The lenses are not altogether dissimilar; however, the mem-
bership organization lens highlights the international delegation, as
well as the diversity of the organization’s members and the fractured
nature of the organization itself.  It also brings to light an important
fact: regardless of any benefits a club may impart to third parties, it
must first and foremost provide benefits to its members that the mem-
bers deem to be worth the costs of membership.
Through the organizational lens, this Article considers the princi-
pal–agent control problem utilizing Albert O. Hirschman’s Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty rubric.  In his exalted book, Hirschman illustrated the dy-
namic relationship of consumer exit, an economic concept, and con-
sumer voice, a political one, in the marketplace and beyond.19
Foundationally, the members of an organization have two possible re-
sponses to unsatisfactory organization performance: they may aban-
don the organization or voice their dissatisfaction in an effort to rectify
the problems.20  Hirschman’s great insight was that the two forces
have a dynamic relationship that can be imagined on a set of scales.
With more meaningful opportunity for voice typically comes less pres-
sure on the exit side of the scale.  Conversely, limited options for exit
16. For a general discussion of the differences between domestic and international
delegation, see John O. McGinnis, Medellı´n and the Future of International Dele-
gation, 118 YALE L.J. 1712, 1717–28 (2009).
17. See, e.g., Katselas, supra note 15, at 127–33, 141–50; Yackee, supra note 15, at
434–48.
18. Yackee, supra note 15, at 401–02.
19. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
20. Id. at 19.
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intensify demands for greater voice.21  Both may spur recuperation of
an organization that is in decline; however, that is not a given and
organizations are not uniformly sensitive to the two responses.22
Moreover, depending on the type of organization involved and the spe-
cific circumstances, exit and voice may complement or counteract each
other.23  Finally, the greater the members’ loyalty to the organization,
the more likely it is they will choose voice over exit.24
Hirschman’s framework has been applied in various legal contexts,
particularly international ones, and Anthea Roberts recently touched
on it in an article on the role of states’ subsequent practice in invest-
ment treaty arbitration.25  It has not yet, however, served as a focal
point for an analysis in this area.  In two remarkable pieces, J.H.H.
Weiler and Joost Pauwelyn applied the analysis to show that the
transformations of Europe and world trade, respectively, were not
clean transitions from power to law as international lawyers might
like to believe, but rather were gradual transitions that occurred
through a series of incremental, bidirectional interactions between
exit (which they analyzed in legal terms) and voice (which they ana-
lyzed in political terms).26  In other words, states gradually accepted
more law (low exit) on the condition of greater political power (high
voice), meaning they increasingly agreed to be bound by firm legal
rules as mechanisms for increased political control, such as veto
power, which were incorporated into the organizations’ designs.27
Though occasional spikes in either exit or voice may serve as catalysts
21. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2411 (1991).
22. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 19.
23. Id. at 19, 74.
24. Id. at 76–82.
25. Weiler, supra note 21. See also Karen E. Boroff & David Lewin, Loyalty, Voice,
and Intent to Exit a Union Firm: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis, 51 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 50 (1997) (analyzing grievance filings at unionized firms); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000) (analyzing class action
issues); Deborah Maranville, Workplace Mythologies and Unemployment Insur-
ance: Exit, Voice and Exhausting All Reasonable Alternatives to Quitting, 31 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 459 (2002) (analyzing voluntary job resignation and unemployment
benefits); Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1 (2005) (analyzing the development and status of the global market); Anthea
Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual
Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 191–93 (2010) (discussing how states use
exit and voice to respond to treaties); Marc A. Rodwin, Exit and Voice in Ameri-
can Health Care, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1041 (1999) (analyzing patients’ abil-
ity to stimulate change in health care); Greg R. Vetter, Exit and Voice in Free and
Open Source Software Licensing: Moderating the Rein over Software Users, 85
OR. L. REV. 183 (2006) (analyzing the forces affecting the software market).
26. Pauwelyn, supra note 25; Weiler, supra note 21.
27. See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 5 (claiming that “the world trade system
evolved from a combination of high exit and low voice in the text of GATT 1947 to
a combination of low exit and high voice in the WTO”).
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for needed change, the spikes reflect that the scales are out of balance,
an unsustainable condition in the long-term.28  As Pauwelyn aptly il-
lustrated, an organization with too much politics and too little law
risks becoming inefficient, whereas an organization with too much law
and too little politics risks becoming unsupported.29
One goal of this Article is to illustrate that the investment arbitra-
tion club did not evolve to its present state through an incremental
process in which states gradually traded their exit options for in-
creased voice.  Rather, the club underwent a tumultuous growth spurt
during which states rapidly conceded meaningful exit options without
appreciating the consequences of their actions and, consequently,
without demanding a commensurate increase in voice.  As states com-
petitively rushed into BITs—and more BITs—without the benefit of
experience with investor–state arbitration, they agreed to a frame-
work of low exit and low voice that did not immediately reveal itself as
problematic.  Now that states have come to appreciate the implica-
tions of their actions, the club finds itself in a particularly trying
“teenager’s crisis.”30
Through a reconnaissance of exit and voice as they operate in the
economy (as an example), Hirschman sought principally to alert econ-
omists to the importance of political forces and political scientists to
the importance of economic ones.31  The aim of this Article is similarly
to conduct a reconnaissance of the forces and their interaction in a
particular context, although I seek mainly to alert lawyers to the im-
portance of politics (voice) in investment treaty arbitration.  My claim
is that a full “depoliticization” of international investment disputes is
no more possible than a full depoliticization of any other international
legal issue, i.e., it is impossible, but a balance between politics and law
is both possible and necessary to attain if the club is to survive.
My approach is similar to the approaches taken by Weiler and
Pauwelyn but differs in at least one significant respect.  Perhaps be-
cause their subjects had evolved considerably more than mine, both
scholars treated voice as principally, if not exclusively, available at the
law-making stage, and exit as principally, if not exclusively, available
28. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 25. See also Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 8 (dis-
cussing the flaws of a system skewed toward either extreme).
29. Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 33–34.
30. Brigitte Stern, The Future of International Investment Law: A Balance Between
the Protection of Investors and the States’ Capacity to Regulate, in THE EVOLVING
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 174, 175 (Jose´ E. Alvarez & Karl P. Sauvant
eds., 2011). See also Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies
Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 49 & n.18 (2013)
(stating that international investment law has progressed from infancy to “awk-
ward adolescence”).
31. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 1, 15–20.
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at the law-applying stage.32  Related to this, both scholars focused on
mechanisms existing within the organizational structure, i.e., legally
permissible mechanisms.33  In an effort to broaden the lens and con-
duct something closer to a true reconnaissance, I highlight opportuni-
ties for exit and voice that exist outside of these constraints.  For
example, states can speak up when they prescribe legal rules in their
BITs, but they can also speak up in protest after an arbitral award is
rendered—they have in fact done both.  On a very practical level, this
Article identifies and begins to assess the effectiveness and interplay
of various actions states are taking to rectify the present imbalance,
with an eye toward identifying the actions most likely to be successful
in the long term.
This Article begins with an overview of the investment treaty arbi-
tration “organization,” which provides background information on the
legal regime and explains how and why I am applying Hirschman’s
rubric to it.  It then considers the availability and operation of exit and
voice within the organization, illustrated by examples of recent ac-
tions taken by states.  The interplay of the two mechanisms and the
degree to which loyalty may be a factor in states’ choice between the
two is then considered.  As will be shown, the fragmented nature of
the legal regime at once complicates the limited exit options that re-
main and creates opportunities for meaningful voice that do not exist
in formal multilateral institutions.  The members of the investment
arbitration club are not functionally limited to exercising their voice
through veto.  They can prescribe new rules and refine many old
ones—insofar, at least, as the rules apply to themselves.
Turning to the question and role of loyalty, this Article posits that
the club members most likely to be loyal are those that most obviously
benefit from membership, the large capital exporters.  Because those
states have the strongest interest in seeing to it that the club survives,
they will likely need to assume the laboring oar in spurring its recu-
peration.  As the loyal members work to retain and recruit those closer
to the fringes of membership, they will need to revamp their member-
ship pitch and make a better case for how the club benefits all, not the
few.  The ensuing conversations between the differentially situated
states may go a long way in bringing about an organization with a
better balance between exit and voice, law and politics, and efficiency
and supportability.  States are encouraged to exercise voice more than
they have in the past, and ultimately to rewrite the investment arbi-
tration club’s terms of membership, particularly focusing on: (1) defin-
ing the club’s mission; (2) adapting the club to changed circumstances;
and (3) achieving a better balance between the costs and benefits of
club membership for all members.
32. Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 5–9; Weiler, supra note 21, at 2411–12, 2423.
33. Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 4–5; Weiler, supra note 21, at 2412.
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II. THE INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
ORGANIZATION
A. What Organization?
Normally, when a group of states decides that something cannot be
accomplished through a mere exchange of promises, they delegate au-
thority to an international organization that, in theory, can neutrally
make decisions which maximize the welfare of all member states and
possibly even address distributional issues among them.34  Interna-
tional organizations are typically established by treaty and comprised
of permanent secretariats, plenary assemblies involving all member
states, and executive organs with more limited functions.35  No such
formal, centralized organization governing international investment
exists.  As is well-known, efforts to negotiate a Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment (MAI) failed rather dramatically in 1998.36  IC-
SID has amassed a large membership, but its strikingly modest
purpose is to provide “facilities for conciliation and arbitration,” which
foreign investors and states may choose to resolve certain disputes.37
Aside from “considering . . . the role of private international invest-
ment” in economic development and “recognizing . . . [that] interna-
tional methods of dispute settlement may be appropriate in certain
cases,” the ICSID Convention is silent with respect to policy or pur-
pose.38  ICSID is also nonexclusive, meaning contracting states are
free to make investor–state arbitration available in forums other than
or in addition to ICSID.
Fortunately for the author, Hirschman did not limit his reconnais-
sance to formal membership organizations or institutions and illus-
trated, through examples, that the analysis can be applied to virtually
any relationship.  While Hirschman directed his work primarily at the
relationship between consumers and competitive business enter-
prises, he also convincingly explained its relevance to numerous other
relationships, including those between individuals and the voluntary
associations, families, churches, and states to which they belong.39
He further demonstrated that different types of “organizations” (in a
34. Andrew T. Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation,
96 CALIF. L. REV. 1693, 1693 (2008).
35. Jose´ E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.
324, 324 (2006).
36. See Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law,
35 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 33, 66–69 (2009). See also supra note 7 (contain-
ing sources that explain the failure to negotiate an MAI).
37. ICSID Convention, supra note 9, art. 1.
38. Id. pmbl.
39. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 3–4, 74–79, 87.
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broad sense) are differentially sensitive to exit and voice.40  Related to
the foregoing, the nature of the organization also affects the extent to
which the two options are available to the organization’s members.41
To illustrate these points, consider Hirschman’s extreme examples of
a competitive business enterprise and a family.42  Members (custom-
ers) of the former have a very easy exit option—buying from the com-
petition—to which the enterprise is highly sensitive.43  For members
of a family, however, the situation is quite the opposite.  Exit is ex-
tremely difficult if not impossible and, in theory at least, there is a
high probability that voice will be effective at spurring change.44
Here, while there is no formal international investment organiza-
tion, there is certainly a “club” of sorts, or a “voluntary association” in
Hirschman’s terminology, that states have created and joined.45  For
purposes of this Article, it is a state’s consent to investor–state arbi-
tration that is the ticket to membership, and not the conclusion of a
BIT generally or the promise of any specific substantive standard of
investment protection.  This choice is made for the simple reason that
states’ consents to arbitration are the relevant delegations of author-
ity that created and empowered the organization.  Without these con-
sents, investor–state arbitration—the object of much of the criticism
levied at the international investment legal regime, as well as many of
the proposals for its reform—would not exist.46  Practically, this crite-
40. Id. at 74.
41. Id. at 76.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Numerous observers have noted and discussed the backlash against the interna-
tional investment legal regime. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Development and Out-
comes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435, 435–37 (2009);
Christopher M. Ryan, Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy
and Stability of International Investment Law, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 725, 726–35
(2008); Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legiti-
macy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Ap-
proach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 58–67 (2011); Asha Kaushal, Note, Revisiting
History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign In-
vestment Regime, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 491, 491–97 (2009). See also UNITED NA-
TIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011: NON-
EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, at 100, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2011, U.N. Sales No. E.11.II.D.2 (2011) (“Countries continue
to conclude [international investment agreements], sometimes with novel provi-
sions aimed at rebalancing the rights and obligations between States and inves-
tors and ensuring coherence between [international investment agreements] and
other public policies.”); UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2010: INVESTING IN A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY, at 85–88, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2010, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.2 (2010) (noting numerous
countries either revised, or had plans to revise, their model BITs and that others
had begun to terminate or renegotiate existing BITs).
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rion does not eliminate many states that have concluded BITs from
the club.  While not all BITs provide for investor–state arbitration, the
great majority of BITs do; a recent study of 1,660 BITs found that only
108, or 7%, did not provide for such arbitration.47  Moreover, and as a
number of scholars have observed, BITs tend to be remarkably similar
in structure and provide for many of the same substantive standards
of treatment, such as fair and equitable treatment and national treat-
ment.48  Many BITs are further linked through most-favored nation
provisions.49
The organization’s character as a voluntary association is signifi-
cant because, according to Hirschman, voluntary associations are
among the few types of organizations where both exit and voice may
play important roles, and where neither may be dominant.50  The vol-
untary association lens is also useful because it serves as a reminder
that states created the organization and are its principals and mem-
bers.51  As John McGinnis has cogently stated, despite numerous new
forms of international administration that have resulted from global-
ization, “legal authority still stems from national sovereignty.”52  In-
vestment arbitration tribunals exercise authority delegated by states
to settle a class of investor–state disputes that would otherwise be
subject to national judicial processes.53  In the study of international
delegation, dispute resolution is regarded as an archetypal task that
states delegate to international agents for the simple reason that they
cannot perform it as efficiently themselves.54  Accordingly, and as
Anthea Roberts has recognized, “[w]hether [investment] tribunals are
viewed as agents or trustees, they are accountable to two or more prin-
cipals—the treaty parties.”55
47. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVES ON INVES-
TOR–STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT 5–6 (2012), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/TY85-G2VH?type=live.
48. Barnali Choudhury, Balancing Investor Protections, the Environment, and
Human Rights: International Investment Law as a Global Public Good, 17 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 481, 490–95 (2013). See Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Founda-
tions of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 186 (2003);
Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 427, 433 (2010); David Schneiderman, Legitimacy and Reflexivity in
International Investment Arbitration: A New Self-Restraint?, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SET-
TLEMENT 471, 473–75, 494 (2011).
49. Choudhury, supra note 48, at 491.
50. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 76–77, 120.
51. See Yackee, supra note 15, at 398 (noting the desirability of locating an appropri-
ate principal on whose behalf the agent is delegated authority to act).
52. McGinnis, supra note 16, at 1714.
53. See ICSID Convention, supra note 9, pmbl.
54. See Roberts, supra note 25, at 186.
55. Roberts, supra note 25, at 196.  Roberts’ statement refers to a debate in the litera-
ture regarding whether international tribunals, and particularly international
courts, should be regarded as agents or trustees.  Trustees are a species of agent
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More fundamentally, it is a basic assumption applicable to a state’s
conclusion of any treaty that the state expected to benefit from con-
cluding the treaty.56  Despite the lack of a central governing body, the
investment arbitration club exists for the same reason that formal
multilateral international organizations exist—states thought it
would help them accomplish goals they could not accomplish on their
own and judged the expected benefits to be worth the anticipated
membership costs.57  As Weiler recognized, an analysis of how exit
and voice operate in a particular organization does not explain states’
willingness to be part of the organization in the first place, and is thus
incomplete on its own.58  The voluntary association lens thus high-
lights that it is of paramount importance that the club benefits states,
quite apart from any benefits it may provide to foreign investors, for-
eign investment, or even the world at large.59  In less abstract terms,
it is natural for states to want more out of the club they created and
joined, to pay less for membership, or to quit it altogether.60
that act for the benefit of a third party, and are typically thought to require a
greater level of independence, though others disagree. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1748 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “trustee” as “[s]omeone who stands in a fiduciary
or confidential relation to another; esp., one who, having legal title to property,
holds it in trust for the benefit of another and owes a fiduciary duty to that bene-
ficiary”). Compare Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in Inter-
national Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005), with Emilie M. Hafner-Burton,
David G. Victor & Yonatan Lupu, Political Science Research on International
Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 85–86 (2012), Laurence R.
Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A
Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 902, 942–54 (2005),
and Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93 CALIF. L.
REV. 957 (2005). Regardless of whether one views some or all international tribu-
nals as trustees, it is clear that states pursue their own goals when they delegate
authority to them, and expect to benefit from the delegation.  As Karen Alter
notes, “[d]elegation to Trustees should not be seen as implying Principals are del-
egating to selfless saints or for altruistic reasons.”  Karen J. Alter, Agents or
Trustees? International Courts in Their Political Context 13 (TranState, Working
Paper No. 8, 2004).
56. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 77 (“Concluding and maintaining a treaty
requires a bargain from which both parties believe they will derive benefits.”).
57. Barbara Koremenos, The Law and Politics of International Delegation: When,
What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
2008, at 151, 152 (“A state delegates functions to an international body if the
expected benefits from the delegation outweigh the expected costs.”). See also
Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 34, at 1695 (noting that delegation comes with
costs as well as benefits).
58. Weiler, supra note 21, at 2429.
59. See supra note 57.
60. See Yackee, supra note 15, at 448 (applying an agency analogy and suggesting
“that there is nothing inherently wrong with states correcting the course of the
[international investment law] ship”). See also Ju¨rgen Kurtz, Australia’s Rejec-
tion of Investor–State Arbitration: Causation, Omission and Implication, 27 IC-
SID REV. 65 (2012) (discussing Australia’s policy shift away from investor–state
arbitration provisions).
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B. A Look Inside the Club
Viewing the investment arbitration machine as a goal-based or-
ganization created by states raises questions about its establishment,
foundation, structure, mission, and future direction.  It also prompts
comparisons to related formal multilateral organizations, most nota-
bly the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Failing a multilateral agreement, the investment arbitration club
came to be through thousands of bilateral treaties.61  Capital-export-
ing states led the way in creating and shaping BITs, which they began
concluding after World War II in light of fears that then-existing in-
ternational investment law was not adequate to protect their nation-
als’ foreign investments.62  The United States moved forward first by
introducing investment protection measures, including equitable
treatment provisions, into its Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
treaties, which were originally limited to the establishment of trade
relations with other states.63  In 1959, Germany concluded the first
BIT with Pakistan after it had lost much of its foreign investment in
the aftermath of the war.64
With respect to the organization’s foundation, it is worth noting
that capital-exporting states’ interest in BITs is obvious, while capital-
importing states’ interest in the treaties is not.65  Developing coun-
tries have historically viewed foreign investment with deep skepti-
cism.66  The most common explanation for developing countries’
willingness to conclude such far-reaching treaties is a belief that BITs
will spur increased inward foreign investment, an assumption that
61. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (1998)
(presenting one theory as to why developing countries uniformly spoke against
affording expansive investment protection before the United Nations but individ-
ually committed to provide such expansive protection in numerous BITs).
62. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 161–74.
63. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 120; Salacuse, supra note 48, at 433,
457.
64. Salacuse, supra note 48, at 433.  Pakistan, for its part, reportedly viewed BITs at
that time as “pieces of paper, something for the press, a good photo opportunity.”
Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Reflections on Pakistan’s Invest-
ment Treaty Program After 50 Years: An Interview with the Former Attorney Gen-
eral of Pakistan, Makhdoom Ali Khan, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Apr. 2009, at
3, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/T5TK-A54H.
65. See Salacuse, supra note 48, at 436–44.
66. Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 411 (2008) (quoting former U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State William L. Thorpe’s statement that, “[a]s engineers
and technicians we are more than welcome; our skills are eagerly sought; but as
businessmen, as entrepreneurs, we are often not so welcome.  Sometimes we feel
that at the same moment that our capital is sought, every obstacle is being put in
the way of its use on a fair and equitable basis.”).
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has not clearly proven to be true.67  The heyday of BIT conclusions
occurred in the wake of the Washington Consensus, which identified
the liberalization of inward foreign investment as an important driver
of economic development—developing states’ ultimate goal—and at a
time when other sources of capital were very limited.68  The willing-
ness of capital-importing states to enter into the treaties had likely
also been bolstered when The United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) recommended “both adherence to and
use of the [ICSID] Convention” in 1968.69  It is further relevant that
the investment arbitration industry did not gear up for some time, and
therefore states did not immediately appreciate the magnitude of the
litigation risk they had assumed when they consented to inves-
tor–state arbitration in BITs.  Accordingly, even after the fervor dissi-
pated and the Washington Consensus became less well-regarded,
BITs continued to be concluded in large numbers for a period of time,
possibly as a “mere formality in diplomatic affairs.”70  If states were
not convinced of the value of having BITs when they concluded some
or all of the treaties, they also did not appear to perceive much risk in
having them.
The establishment of the organization through thousands of bilat-
eral treaties means, of course, that multilateral negotiations—where
67. Salacuse, supra note 48, at 441–42. See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1,
at 8 (noting that there is scant evidence that the conclusion of a BIT causes an
increase in foreign investment); Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, In-
vestment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 340 (2007) (suggesting that the availability of investment
treaty arbitration may not directly trigger foreign direct investment but is one
factor in the decisional matrix); Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment
Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evi-
dence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 400 (2011) (arguing that BITs do not meaningfully
influence foreign investors’ decisions to invest in particular countries). But see,
e.g., Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase
Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567, 1582
(2005) (arguing that BITs have significant positive impacts on foreign direct
investment).
68. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES, U.N. Doc. E/4446, U.N. Sales No. E.68.II.D.2 (1968); Sergio Puig, Emer-
gence and Dynamism in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor–State
Arbitration & International Investment Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 531, 542 (2013);
Salacuse, supra note 48, at 442–43, 449. See John Williamson, A Short History of
the Washington Consensus, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 7, 10 (2009).
69. Puig, supra note 68, at 542.
70. Id. at 564.  Some degree of path dependence was also likely at work. See Hafner-
Burton, Victor & Lupu, supra note 55, at 82; Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in
Discrimination Law: Employment Cases in the United States and the European
Union, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 115 (2010); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path
Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000) (explain-
ing that legal designs generally are commonly influenced by various factors, in-
cluding political will and path dependence).
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all members would have had a seat at the table and at least some
voice in the organization’s powers and limits—never occurred.  Re-
lated to this, Andrew Guzman observed in 1998 that developing coun-
tries stood together before the United Nations in their opposition to
the customary international law “Hull rule,” which required “prompt,
adequate and effective” compensation for expropriation, while at the
same time they individually concluded over a thousand BITs which
went well beyond the Hull rule in terms of affording protection to for-
eign investment.71  Guzman explained this seemingly paradoxical be-
havior as a prisoner’s dilemma in which it was optimal for developing
states to oppose the Hull rule as a group but defect individually in
order to gain an advantage over other developing states that had not
concluded BITs or otherwise eliminate an advantage possessed by de-
veloping states that had concluded BITs.72  In other words, there was
fierce competition to attract inward foreign investment, and BITs
were viewed as an important, if not the, way to do it.
The bilateral treaties and the race to conclude them are also signif-
icant factors in the relatively undeveloped structure and mission of
the organization.  Regarding the former, early BITs did not provide for
investor–state dispute settlement, making states’ promises to afford
the imprecise substantive standards of treatments much less signifi-
cant in terms of litigation risk than they have proven to be in conjunc-
tion with investors’ ability to seek compensation from host states via
arbitration.  Again, capital-exporting states led the way in seeking in-
vestor–state dispute settlement, and again, they did so when they
were predominantly concerned with obtaining protections for their na-
tionals’ foreign investments; these states did not then appear to con-
template being a respondent in investor–state arbitration.  The
capital exporters obtained a significant victory in this regard with the
ICSID Convention through, notably, a trade of silence on the issue of
host states’ substantive legal obligations with respect to foreign
investment.73
As noted above, the ICSID Convention is a conspicuously skeletal
instrument.  It does not define “investment” or the scope of the parties’
consent to arbitration, leaving those decisions to the contracting
states.74  In many BITs, states modeled their investor–state dispute
settlement provisions after the state–state dispute settlement provi-
71. Guzman, supra note 61, at 641–42.
72. Id. at 666–67. See also Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Com-
peting for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265 (2008) (positing developing nations establish BITs to
remain competitive with similarly-situated host countries).
73. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 48 (2009); Puig, supra note 68, at 542–43.
74. ICSID Convention, supra note 9, art. 25 (providing that ICSID’s jurisdiction ex-
tends to “any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment” between a con-
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sions, without apparently considering the significant differences be-
tween the two provisions or the dramatic increase in litigation risk the
former created.  The 2005 BIT between Germany and Egypt, for in-
stance, contains an investor–state dispute settlement provision that is
little different from the state–state dispute settlement provision in the
same treaty or, for that matter, the state–state dispute settlement
provision in Germany’s first BIT with Pakistan.75  Further, and as
mentioned previously, because there was a lag between the heyday of
BIT conclusions and the gearing up of the investment arbitration in-
dustry, states continued to conclude BITs before they had an opportu-
nity to fully feel the impacts of investor–state arbitration provisions.
With respect to mission, the ICSID Convention is again conspicu-
ously silent, especially when compared to other agreements establish-
ing international organizations—most notably the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agree-
ment).76  The WTO Agreement’s ambitious, expressly stated objec-
tives include “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment,”
and expanding trade in goods and services “in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and pre-
serve the environment.”77  The need for efforts to ensure that develop-
ing, and especially least-developed, countries obtain a share of growth
in international trade “commensurate with the needs of their eco-
nomic development” is explicitly stated.78  Further direction is pro-
vided to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).79
That agreement makes clear, for instance, that the DSB’s role is to
achieve a “satisfactory settlement” of disputes and that, absent a mu-
tually agreeable solution, the objective is usually to secure withdrawal
of a trade measure found to be inconsistent with WTO substantive
law, which is also considerably more specific than the substantive law
tracting state and a national of another contracting state, where the parties have
consented in writing to ICSID jurisdiction).
75. Agreement Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Egypt-Ger., arts. VIII–IX, June 16, 2005, 2637 U.N.T.S. 183; Treaty for the Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments, Pak.-Ger., art. XI, Nov. 25, 1959, 24
U.N.T.S. 6575.
76. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
77. Id. pmbl.
78. Id.
79. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. See also PETER VAN DEN
BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 51 (2d ed.
2008) (providing a detailed analysis of the institutional structure of the WTO).
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governing international investment.80  In short, members of the WTO
have significant information about the club they joined, and the
WTO’s dispute settlement bodies have considerable guidance as to
their functions and roles.81  By comparison, states’ membership in the
investment arbitration club does not necessarily signify any policy
agreement beyond an acknowledgment that it may sometimes—in un-
defined “certain” cases—be appropriate to settle investor–state dis-
putes in an international, rather than domestic, forum.  The ICSID
Convention’s reference to “the need for international cooperation for
economic development,” and “the role of private investment therein,”
is not particularly specific, and many BITs, particularly early ones,
contain only skeletal statements of object and purpose.82  To preview
one way in which states are increasingly exercising greater voice in
the investment arbitration club, the object and purpose statements in
a number of recent BITs are phrased not in narrow terms of invest-
ment protection and promotion but instead in terms of economic coop-
eration and growth that reflect the treaty parties’ broader goals.83
80. DSU, supra note 79, art. 3.  WTO substantive law is set forth in a number of
“covered agreements” and is also quite specific relative to the “standards of pro-
tection” which comprise substantive international investment law.
81. See Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45
VA. J. INT’L L. 631, 650–51 (2005).
82. ICSID Convention, supra note 9, pmbl.
83. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of
Botswana Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, Ger.-Bots., pmbl., May 23, 2000, 2470 U.N.T.S. 327 (“desiring to intensify
economic co-operation between both States” and “recognizing that the encourage-
ment and contractual protection of such investments are apt to stimulate private
business initiative and to increase the prosperity of both nations”); Agreement
Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the
Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Indon.-India,
pmbl., Feb. 8, 1999, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/YTT9-VFFW?type=pdf
(“[d]esiring to create conditions favourable for fostering greater investment by
investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party”
and “[r]ecognising that the encouragement and mutual protection of such invest-
ment will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business initiative and
will increase prosperity in both Contracting Parties”); Agreement Between the
Government of Australia and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-Arg., pmbl., Jan. 11, 1997, 1985
U.N.T.S. 86 (“DESIRING to intensify economic cooperation between both coun-
tries” and “RECOGNISING that the promotion and protection of such invest-
ments . . . will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business initiative to
the benefit of both countries”); Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protec-
tion of Investment, U.S.-Ecuador, pmbl., Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-
15 (1993) (“[d]esiring to promote greater economic cooperation between them,
with respect to investment by nationals and companies of one Party in the terri-
tory of the other Party” and “[r]ecognizing that agreement upon the treatment to
be accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the
economic development of the Parties”).
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An important corollary to the limited nature of the club’s charter is
limited direction and control at an organizational level regarding the
scope and objectives of the delegation of authority.  It is useful at this
juncture to return briefly to the comparison between investment
treaty arbitration and domestic administrative judicial review.  As
noted previously, there are a number of similarities between the sys-
tems, including the private right of action, imprecise substantive stan-
dards, and, frequently, the nature of the challenged governmental
action.  This has led to useful comparisons, but it is evident and im-
portant to note that the entities occupy very different institutional
roles and operate under disparate constraints.  Specifically, whereas
investment arbitration tribunals are states’ agents, domestic courts
performing administrative judicial review serve as a check on execu-
tive branch agents within a tripartite system of government.84  Again,
John McGinnis explained it well that Americans “do not regard the
actions of [domestic] courts in interpreting a law as a delegation of
legislative or executive power because of the position of courts in our
system of separation of powers.”85  Investment arbitration tribunals
do not occupy a comparable position and, furthermore, the mecha-
nisms of accountability that exist in our domestic system are absent in
the international realm.86  Thus, attention to the bipartite princi-
pal–agent relationship takes on increased importance.
Largely as a result of the race to conclude BITs, the investment
arbitration club amassed a large membership in a relatively short pe-
riod of time.  Canada’s recent ratification of the ICSID Convention
brings the Convention’s total membership to 150; an additional num-
ber of states may have consented to investor–state arbitration in only
some other forum.87  To put that number in context, 193 states are
members of the United Nations.88
The club is therefore large and is also going through a period of
transition as a result of changed circumstances and members’ exper-
iences so far.  Investment flows have changed and increased dramati-
cally since the club’s early days and many former capital-importing
states are now also significant exporters of capital; UNCTAD reports
developing and transition economies generated a record 39% of global
84. U.S. CONST. art. III. See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502, 537 (2009) (discussing the judiciary’s role in reviewing administra-
tive action).
85. McGinnis, supra note 16, at 1726.
86. Id. at 1720–25.
87. List of Contracting States and Other Signatories to the Convention, INT’L CTR. FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES (Apr. 11, 2014), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&lan-
guage=English, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/XYQ9-CFFA.
88. Member States of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS (July 5, 2014), http://
www.un.org/en/members/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5W4-34QD.
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FDI outflows in 2013, compared to only 7% fifteen years earlier.89
Traditional “North–South” BITs between capital-exporting and capi-
tal-importing countries have not been the only game in town for some
time.90  “North–North” BITs between two capital exporters whose na-
tionals invest in each other have become more common, and
“South–South” BITs between two capital-importing countries have
proliferated.91  A related change is that nearly 100 states, including
some significant capital exporters, have now been respondents in one
or more investor–state disputes, some of which have challenged host
state laws and policies of general application, culminated in substan-
tial pecuniary awards, or both.  These sovereignty and financial costs,
which are not distributed equally, appear to be costs that states did
not anticipate fully when they joined the club.  Not surprisingly, the
most frequent respondents, Argentina, Venezuela, and Ecuador, are
among the states that have taken steps to distance themselves from
the club.92  Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have each denounced the
ICSID Convention.93  Argentina remains a member of ICSID for the
time being but has taken the controversial position that it is not re-
quired to pay an ICSID award until the prevailing foreign investor
pursues formal proceedings in an Argentine court, a position that
some, including the U.S. government, view as noncompliance.94  Less
dramatic than either of the above, but arguably more significant, Aus-
tralia, which is a significant capital exporter and has been a respon-
dent in only a handful of investment arbitrations, announced in 2011
it would no longer seek to include investor–state dispute settlement
provisions in its future trade agreements, something it had previously
89. UNCTAD WIR 2014, supra note 4, at ix, 5.
90. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 6.
91. Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, The Significance of the South–South BITs for the In-
ternational Investment Regime: A Quantitative Analysis, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 101 (2010); Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 77. Depending on what
countries are considered “South” countries, such BITs may make up approxi-
mately 40% of the global BIT network.  Poulsen reaches this conclusion by count-
ing both transition and developing countries as “South” countries. Id. at n.2.
92. IIA Issues Note: Recent Developments, supra note 5, at 4.
93. Pursuant to Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, Venezuela’s denunciation be-
came effective on July 25, 2012, six months from the date of its notice. Venezuela
Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, supra note 9.  Bolivia
and Ecuador submitted Article 71 notices in 2007 and 2009, respectively. Bolivia
Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, supra note 9; Ecua-
dor Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, supra note 9.
94. Charles B. Rosenberg, The Intersection of International Trade and International
Arbitration: The Use of Trade Benefits to Secure Compliance with Arbitral
Awards, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 503, 510–15 (2013).  The United States government,
for one, rejects Argentina’s position and has taken the position that Argentina
has failed to comply with its obligations under the ICSID Convention; on May 28,
2012, the United States suspended Argentina’s preferential trade status under
the Generalized System of Preferences in an effort to force Argentina to satisfy its
arbitral awards. Id. at 504.
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done “at the behest of foreign investors.”95  Yet another change from
the club’s early days is that UNCTAD now frequently expresses con-
cern about the current state of international investment law and high-
lights opportunities for reform.96
On top of all this, whether BITs contribute meaningfully to an in-
crease in foreign investment, much less spur economic development,
remains an open question.97  Brazil, for instance, has become a top
destination for foreign investment despite never having ratified a sin-
gle BIT.98  It is generally accepted that BITs contribute to a favorable
investment climate, but the costs states are willing to pay for that
benefit may quite reasonably be less than the costs they would be will-
ing to pay for greater benefits in terms of foreign investment and eco-
nomic development, especially if they do not see a strong need to
improve their investment climate and have well-functioning judicial
institutions.99  This underscores both that the costs and benefits of
95. AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, GILLARD GOVERNMENT
TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND PROSPERITY 14
(2011).  The statement relays the Gillard Government’s view that such provisions
“would confer greater legal rights on foreign businesses than those available to
domestic businesses.” Id.  It further states that, “[i]n the past, Australian Gov-
ernments have sought the inclusion of investor–state dispute resolution proce-
dures in trade agreements with developing countries at the behest of Australian
businesses.  The Gillard Government will discontinue this practice.” Id.  See also
Kurtz, supra note 60, at 65 (stating that Australia became part of a group of
States “now engaged in a remarkable process of transforming the investment
treaty network” when its government “publicly announced in a Trade Policy
Statement that it would no longer include investor–State dispute resolution pro-
cedures in future trade agreements”).
96. See, e.g., UNCTAD WIR 2014, supra note 4, at 126–32 (discussing four paths of
reform); UNCTAD WIR 2013, supra note 10 at 105, 107–17 (“The current IIA
regime is known for its complexity and incoherence, gaps and overlaps.”).
97. See supra note 67.
98. Come and Get Me: Argentina Is Putting International Arbitration to the Test,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21547836, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/M5KT-EYGL; Full List of Bilateral Investment Agreements
Concluded, 1 June 2013 by Brazil, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.
(June 1, 2013), http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_brazil.pdf, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/C3VU-YF2P (showing no ratifications).
99. Come and Get Me: Argentina Is Putting International Arbitration to the Test,
supra note 98 (stating that Australia will remain a popular destination for invest-
ment without arbitration due to its reliable local courts and rich natural re-
sources). See also Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 111–12 (concluding that
nations likely will negotiate more BITs in the years ahead but that the “role of
BITs as a source of international law applicable beyond the two parties to the BIT
itself . . . could portend the development—indeed perhaps the current existence—
of a multilateral international investment regime built on sources of law other
than treaties”); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic
Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 501, 526 (1998) (noting that the question remains whether the policies that a
BIT requires should be codified in a BIT).
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club membership are not equal and that a central entity capable of
addressing the distributional inequalities does not presently exist.
The respective value of BITs is relevant for the additional reason
that it is likely a significant factor in states’ respective degrees of loy-
alty to the organization.  As illustrated by the examples of a competi-
tive business enterprise and a family, a member’s loyalty to an
organization generally increases the likelihood that voice will be se-
lected over exit.  Another factor in the degree of loyalty is whether the
organization is not merely two-dimensional (in terms of membership
costs and benefits) but instead also includes a third “public good di-
mension.”100  Hirschman opines that such a dimension is a common
feature of membership organizations and illustrates it well with the
example of a national political party:
If I disagree with an organization, say, a political party, I can resign as a
member, but generally I cannot stop being a member of the society in which
the objectionable party functions.  If I participate in the making of a foreign
policy of which I have come to disapprove, I can resign my official policy-mak-
ing position, but cannot stop being unhappy as a citizen of a country which
carries on what seems to me an increasingly disastrous foreign policy.  In both
these examples, the individual is at first both producer and consumer of such
public goods as party policy and foreign policy; he can stop being producer, but
cannot stop being consumer.101
Whether the organization contains a public good dimension, and
states’ loyalty to it more broadly, will be revisited later in this Article.
For present purposes, the “organization” is a voluntary membership
association that formed rapidly without all the players at the table
and launched into operation with little structure and an unclear mis-
sion.  When states rushed to join the club, they rapidly and relatively
blindly agreed to a combination of low exit and low voice, in contrast to
the course they followed in joining and refining other organizations,
where a transition from high exit and low voice to low exit and high
voice occurred gradually over time.102  The organization exists today
in an environment very different from the one in which it was created
and has unclear benefits and unanticipated membership costs.  In
light of these characteristics and the present imbalance of exit and
voice, it is suggested that three important recuperative goals for
states to pursue include: (1) defining the club’s mission; (2) adapting
the club to changed circumstances; and (3) balancing the costs and
benefits of membership.  States’ options for spurring change through
exit and voice are explored next in Part III.
100. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 102.
101. Id.
102. Cf. Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 5–7, 23–29; Weiler, supra note 21, at 2408.
2014] EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 335
III. EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY
A. Exit: A Long, Difficult, and Open Road to the Door
1. The Three Types of Exit and the Unavailability of Selective
Exit
As described by Hirschman, the economist’s exit is neat and imper-
sonal, and the recuperation automatic.103  The latter comes by way of
Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand “as an unintended by-product of the cus-
tomer’s decision to shift.”104  The mechanics of exit are very different
in the legal, political, and economic realm occupied by international
investment treaties.  As will be shown, a full “formal” or “total” exit
from the investment arbitration club requires the resigning state to
travel a long, difficult, and very open road, terminating treaties all
along the way.  This is attributable to several factors, including the
fragmented nature of the legal framework, the legal exit costs imposed
in BITs, and the inherently political nature of treaty termination.
And while “partial” exit options exist due to the fragmented nature of
the legal regime, they are not of a degree or nature sufficient to allevi-
ate any significant amount of pressure on the voice side of the scale.
“Selective” exit is not an available option from the club as it is defined
here.
It is useful to briefly revisit Weiler and Pauwelyn’s respective in-
terpretations of exit and explain how and why my interpretation dif-
fers for purposes of the investment arbitration club.  In the context of
the European Community, Weiler concluded that Member State with-
drawal, which he termed “formal” or “total” exit, would not benefit
from legal analysis because it was widely regarded to be illegal, and
therefore focused on “selective” exit, which he defined as the Member
States’ practice of retaining their memberships while seeking to evade
their obligations, by either omission or commission.105  Pauwelyn sim-
ilarly focused on possibilities within the constraints of WTO member-
ship, defining exit as “the lack of law or discipline or the thickness of a
system’s legal-normative structure, which offers easy options to defect
from the cooperative regime.”106
For a number of reasons, it is important to go beyond selective exit
in this context to also consider partial and total exit options, i.e.,
treaty termination possibilities.  For one thing, having defined the
club in terms of states’ consent to investor–state arbitration, an analy-
sis of states’ options to selectively avoid the requirement to arbitrate
103. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 15.
104. Id.
105. Weiler, supra note 21, at 2412.
106. Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 5.
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disputes they have consented to arbitrate would not go very far; how-
ever, as discussed below, it is significant in evaluating the overall dif-
ficulty of exit.  As understood here, selective exit is a surreptitious
activity.  It is the act of evading or shirking obligations when the
chances of getting caught, or at least of getting caught and incurring
any significant repercussions, are low.  It is not, by contrast, the act of
protesting the obligations, which is an exercise of voice that will be
addressed later in this Part, or of formally terminating them, which is
an exercise of either partial or total exit.  As Weiler explains, selective
exit is a much more common temptation than total exit in the life of
many international organizations.107  Indeed, it would seem the avail-
ability of selective exit would lessen the likelihood of partial or total
exit in many cases, given that the latter are inherently public acts
that may be regarded as disrespectful of international law and have
significant legal repercussions or political repercussions, or both.108
Selective exit is not an available option in the investment arbitra-
tion club because, once a state consents to investor–state arbitration,
it becomes all but impossible for the state to surreptitiously evade the
requirement to arbitrate disputes within the scope of its consent or,
down the line, to surreptitiously evade the requirement to satisfy an
arbitral award.  This fact renders it important to step back for a mo-
ment from the club as I have defined it.  Before states consented to
investor–state arbitration, selective exit from the broader “investment
treaty” club was not only possible, but quite easy, given the combina-
tion of imprecise substantive standards and weak enforcement
(state–state arbitration being the only option).  The inclusion of inves-
tor–state arbitration was a game-changer that does not appear to have
been immediately recognized as such, as it did not occur gradually and
was not accompanied by a contemporaneous increase in states’ voice,
such as limits on arbitrability or more specific substantive standards
of investment protection.  Accordingly, whereas states gradually relin-
quished selective exit as they acquired greater voice in other organiza-
tions, they effectively checked it at the door to the investment
arbitration club.109  It is tempting to view that closure as a significant
victory for law over power, as it rendered the law much more “real.”110
One objective of this Article, however, is to illustrate that law cannot
107. Weiler, supra note 21, at 2412. See also Laurence Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA.
L. REV. 1579, 1587 (2005) (“Particularly given the international legal system’s
relatively anarchic environment, in which surreptitious shirking of treaty obliga-
tions is often plausible, a state’s decision to follow the rules of the game, publicize
a future withdrawal, and open itself to scrutiny demonstrates a kind of respect
for international law.”).
108. Helfer, supra note 107, at 1587.
109. See supra note 102.
110. Weiler, supra note 21, at 2423.
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exist without politics, and vice versa.111  The closure of the selective
exit door without a corresponding increase in voice is thus cause for
concern.
A second and related reason to consider partial and total exit op-
tions in this context is that they are more of a possibility (illustrated
most clearly by the fact that they are occurring) than they are in ei-
ther the European context or the WTO.  That is likely due both to the
unavailability of selective exit and to the greater political tenability of
formal exit from the investment arbitration club relative to many
other international organizations.  Given the club’s beginnings and
fragmented nature, as well as the backlash against it, the political
ramifications of terminating an investment treaty are likely less than
the ramifications of terminating many other treaties, where the act
would signify the state’s withdrawal from a highly-regarded, multilat-
eral organization, or at least one that is more clearly important for
political or economic reasons.112
Finally, considering partial and total exit options is consistent with
Hirschman’s objective of conducting a reconnaissance of how exit and
voice operate within a particular organization.  The goal is not merely
to assess what is legal and illegal given, as Weiler recognized, that
legal considerations will not always be (and perhaps rarely will be) the
decisive factor in terminating treaties.113  The goal is instead to step
back and see the forest for the trees, i.e., to see what is occurring in
terms of exit and voice, and then to assess whether the forces are in
balance and their respective potential, if any, to spur recuperation of
the organization.  Related to this, it is significant that some states are
exercising their partial and total exit options, because it means not
only that the law is hard in terms of its binding nature (such that
selective exit is unavailable), but also in terms of its normative
weight, or “thickness,” as Pauwelyn describes it.114  As has been illus-
trated elsewhere, international investment law is indeed hard in that
investment treaty disputes may implicate significant issues of public
importance that go to the heart of state sovereignty and have
culminated in substantial pecuniary awards.115  If the law were not
111. See Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 33 (explaining that an organization with too
much law or too little politics runs the risk of being unsupported).
112. Of course, the actual political salience of an investment treaty termination will
vary according to a number of factors, including the states involved and the
events leading up to the termination.  Helfer, supra note 107, at 1585, 1608.
113. Weiler, supra note 21, at 2412.
114. Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 5.
115. IIA Issues Note: Recent Developments, supra note 5 (noting the record-setting pe-
cuniary award in an investment treaty dispute in Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, ¶ 876 (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1094.pdf,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/DCN4-2TYB); Rudolf Dolzer, The Impact of In-
ternational Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J.
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“hard” in a normative sense, then it would matter little if it were
“hard” in terms of being binding, and the closure of the selective exit
door would be inconsequential.  That is not the case here.
2. The Long Road to Formal Exit
Perhaps because treaty termination may inherently be regarded as
disrespectful of international law, it has received little attention by
legal and international relations scholars.116  That is certainly true in
the investment treaty context.  The operational point has been made
that denunciation of the ICSID Convention, which is permitted upon
written notice and takes effect six months thereafter, is not alone suf-
ficient to terminate the availability of investor–state arbitration in the
many BITs containing a state’s consent to other forms of arbitra-
tion.117  This underscores that a state’s membership in ICSID does not
constitute the relevant delegation of authority that must be undele-
gated in order to sever the principal–agent relationship.  That delega-
tion is generally contained in BITs, although it may also be contained
in other instruments, such as legislation or contracts.
As a legal matter, therefore, a state’s ability to resign its member-
ship in the investment arbitration club depends on the specific instru-
ment—or, realistically, instruments—in which it consented to such
arbitration.  In BITs, unilateral termination is typically permitted af-
ter the treaty has been in force for a specified number of years, often
ten or fifteen, and generally takes effect following a specified waiting
period after notice is provided, commonly six months or a year.118
This structure is used for the simple reason that investments, unlike
trade transactions, are typically long-term endeavors.119  Unilateral
termination may be available at any time following the initial in-force
INT’L L. & POL. 953, 964 (2005) (noting that investment treaty disputes can tread
on delicate issues typically within the domaine re´serve´ of states); Katselas, supra
note 15, at 114–20 (2012) (comparing investment treaty arbitration to U.S. ad-
ministrative law).
116. Helfer, supra note 107, at 1585, 1608, 1611 (discussing the lack of attention to the
topic generally).
117. ICSID Convention, supra note 9, art. 71; Diana Marie Wick, The Counter-Produc-
tivity of ICSID Denunciation and Proposals for Change, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 239,
272–73 (2012).
118. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Mozambique Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, United States-Mozam., art. XVI, Dec. 1, 1998, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 106-31 (2000) (entered into force Mar. 3, 2005), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/TX2-RAEV [hereinafter United States–Mozambique BIT]
(may be terminated after ten years with a one-year waiting period); Agreement
Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Argentine Re-
public on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, and Protocol, Austl.-Arg.,
art. 15, Jan. 11, 1997, 1985 U.N.T.S. 86, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6JW-
P7DD (same).
119. See Helfer, supra note 107, at 1625.
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period or only at specified intervals thereafter, e.g., the same period as
the initial one.120  Of course, if the parties mutually consent, Article
54(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) permits
treaty termination at any time.121
Aside from the timing constraints on termination, most BITs con-
tain continuing effects or “survival” clauses which extend the treaty’s
provisions, including the availability of investor–state arbitration, for
investments made, acquired, or approved while the treaty was in ef-
fect for specified periods following termination, such as ten, fifteen, or
twenty years.122  Jeswald Salacuse has referred to this as the regime’s
“sticky” quality.123  In practical effect, therefore, states may remain
obligated to arbitrate investor–state disputes long after they decide to
withdraw the consent given in a particular instrument.124  Bolivia is a
notable example.  It became the first state to denounce the ICSID
Convention in 2007.125  That denunciation removed (or will eventually
remove, as noted below126) the possibility of ICSID arbitration, but
reference must be made to Bolivia’s BITs to determine if foreign inves-
tors have other options.127  Bolivia’s BIT with the United States, for
example, is not limited to ICSID arbitration.  The treaty provides for
ICSID arbitration if it is available, but also provides for ICSID Addi-
tional Facility arbitration, UNCITRAL arbitration, or, if the parties
agree, arbitration in any other arbitration institution pursuant to any
other arbitration rules.128
120. Compare United States–Mozambique BIT, supra note 118, art. XVI (permitting
termination any time after the initial period), with Agreement on the Encourage-
ment and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Republic of Ecuador
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Ecuador-Neth., art. 14, June 27, 1999, 2240
U.N.T.S. 19 (entered into force July 1, 2001), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
J23F-P26L [hereinafter Ecuador–Netherlands BIT] (permitting termination only
every ten years).
121. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 54(b), opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter
VCLT].
122. See Salacuse, supra note 48, at 472 and n.215 (2010) (listing examples).
123. Id. at 471–72.
124. The basic purpose of exit costs such as these is to promote legal stability. See
Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law, 51
HARV. INT’L L.J. 379, 404 (2010).
125. See supra note 93.
126. See infra note 127.
127. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  It should be noted that at least one
attempt has been made to establish ICSID jurisdiction in the absence of a state’s
consent through a Most Favored Nation clause, where the state had consented to
such jurisdiction in another treaty.  Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 721
(2005).  The tribunal in Plama rejected the attempt. Id. ¶¶ 183, 184, 223, 227.
128. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Bolivia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
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On June 10, 2011, Bolivia gave notice that it was terminating its
BIT with the United States, which took effect one year later on June
10, 2012.129  Under the treaty’s ten-year continuing effects clause,
U.S. investors may continue to initiate arbitration under the ICSID
Additional Facility, assuming it remains available, or in accordance
with UNCITRAL, if it does not, until June 10, 2022, for investments
established or acquired prior to June 10, 2012.130  Further, as Bolivia
remains a party to at least fifteen other BITs, nationals of the states
covered by those treaties can, as of now, continue to initiate non-IC-
SID investment arbitration against the state indefinitely, assuming
those treaties contain investor–state dispute settlement provisions
similar to the one in the Bolivia–United States BIT.131  The most sig-
nificant difference between ICSID and ICSID Additional Facility arbi-
tration is that the ICSID Convention’s enforcement and recognition
provisions do not apply to the latter, and the awards are not insulated
from scrutiny by domestic courts.132  Accordingly, it has been specu-
lated that Bolivia denounced the ICSID Convention in part to gain the
ability to challenge investor–state arbitration awards.133  The pros-
pect of domestic court review is generally regarded as a disadvantage
for investors, given that a salient feature of ICSID arbitration is its
self-contained nature.134  ICSID Additional Facility arbitration is not
uncommon, however, and has been used for North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) disputes, for example, because not all
NAFTA parties have ratified the ICSID Convention.135
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Bol., art. IX(3), adopted Apr. 17, 1998, T.I.A.S. No.
12,943 (entered into force June 6, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.–Bolivia BIT].
129. U.S.–Bolivia BIT, supra note 128, art. XVI(2); Notice of Termination of United
States–Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,584 (proposed May
23, 2012).
130. U.S.–Bolivia BIT, supra note 128, art. XVI(1).
131. See Bolivia, Plurinational State of, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), UNITED
NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
IIA.CountryBits/24#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Sept. 26, 2014), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/T5ZU-TVPA.
132. The Additional Facility Rules are available at Additional Facility Rules, INT’L
CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES (Apr. 2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/ICSID/AdditionalFacilityRules.jsp, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
UDD5-4E2M. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 225.  Additional Facility
arbitration is available when only one side is a party to the ICSID Convention.
Id. See Wick, supra note 117, at 274–85, for a comparison of the types of
arbitration.
133. See Wick, supra note 117, at 285.
134. See Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 605
(2013) (expressing concern that domestic courts may dilute international invest-
ment law through consideration of domestic law and policies).
135. Up until December 1, 2013, when Canada became a party to the ICSID Conven-
tion, the United States was the only NAFTA party that was also a party to the
ICSID Convention.  North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
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Bolivia’s denunciation of the ICSID Convention attracted a great
deal of attention, as did Ecuador and Venezuela’s subsequent denunci-
ations.  As a practical matter, however, those denunciations did not
effectuate exits from the investment arbitration club so much as shifts
from one “product”—ICSID arbitration—to arbitration “products” of-
fered by ICSID’s “competition.”  This is the first partial exit option
available to states, and it is the one most analogous—yet still a long
way from—the economist’s silent marketplace shift.  While both the
motivation for and wisdom of the states’ product shifts may be de-
bated, the salient point for present purposes is that they are not tanta-
mount to resignations from the investment arbitration club.  Notably,
as discussed below, both Bolivia and Venezuela have, as of now, left
the great majority of their BITs in force.  Moreover, the states have
pledged, along with ten other Latin American states, to support the
establishment and use of a regional forum for the settlement of inter-
national investment disputes.136  Collectively, these actions may sug-
gest that the states are dissatisfied with ICSID arbitration but are
considering the possibility of remaining in the club if a better—from
their point of view—product comes on the market.
Importantly, denunciation of the ICSID Convention does not re-
lieve the denouncing state of any of its obligations under an existing
BIT including, for example, the substantive obligation to provide fair
and equitable treatment to covered foreign investments.  By contrast,
a state’s unilateral or mutual termination of a BIT, such as Bolivia’s
termination of its BIT with the United States, will, eventually, elimi-
nate all of the parties’ obligations to one another under the applicable
treaty.137
This is the second partial exit option available to states, and it is at
once broader in scope and narrower in application than the first op-
tion.  In effect, it is a severance of club relations with one other mem-
ber that terminates not only the mutual procedural obligation to
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; DOLZER & SCHREUER,
supra note 1, at 225.
136. Declaration of the 1st Ministerial Meeting of the Latin American States Affected
by Transnational Interests, MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y MOVILIDAD
HUMANA (Apr. 22, 2013), http://cancilleria.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/
22abr_declaracion_transnacionales_eng.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
4T8L-9ER6.
137. The ICSID Convention establishes ICSID as an available forum for the resolution
of investor–state disputes but does not impose any substantive obligations on
states vis-a`-vis foreign investors or foreign investments.  ICSID Convention,
supra note 9, art. 1.  Those obligations, as well as states’ consents to settle invest-
ment disputes, are typically contained in BITs.  Accordingly, a state’s denuncia-
tion of the ICSID Convention operates only to remove ICSID as an available
arbitral forum; the state must terminate its BITs to eliminate its substantive
international investment obligations as well as to withdraw its consent to other
dispute settlement mechanisms. See Wick, supra note 117, at 248.
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arbitrate investor–state disputes but also the mutual substantive obli-
gations existing under the applicable treaty.  Viewed in one light, it is
a singularly cast and singularly effective blackball of another club
member.  A state’s decision to terminate a single BIT may be moti-
vated by any number of factors, including disaffection with particular
actions taken by the other state or the other state’s investors, or both.
Bolivia, for instance, terminated its BIT with the United States
shortly after an ICSID tribunal resumed proceedings in a dispute reg-
istered by U.S. investors more than two years after Bolivia had de-
nounced the ICSID Convention.138  This suggests Bolivia may have
been willing to leave its BIT with the United States in force—as it had
for more than four years following its denunciation of the ICSID Con-
vention—until that breaking point.  An isolated termination may also
reflect a state’s dissatisfaction with a particular BIT.  Venezuela ter-
minated its BIT with the Netherlands, reportedly to the Netherlands’
surprise, after a number of companies “nationality shopped” by using
Dutch corporate vehicles to route their investments into Venezuela
due to the treaty’s particularly broad provisions.139  As of the date of
this Article, at least fifteen Bolivian BITs and twenty-seven Venezue-
lan BITs remained in force.140
The foregoing partial exit options are available as a result of the
regime’s fragmented nature.  The full suite of a state’s investment ar-
bitration obligations is likely to be spread across ten or twenty trea-
ties.  This creates partial exit options that would not exist under a
consolidated legal framework, but, conversely, it complicates the full
exit option because the exiting state must terminate many treaties
instead of one and pay separately the attendant exit costs.
At least 180 states have executed BITs, and of those states, a small
number appear to have embarked on the long and open road toward
full, formal club resignation.  Of these states, Ecuador has done so
138. Pan Am. Energy LLC v. Plurinational State of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/8
(proceeding is pending pursuant to the parties’ agreement on June 21, 2014 to
suspend the proceeding until August 21, 2014). See also Petr Polasek & Ryan
Mellske, Termination of Bolivia–United States Bilateral Investment Treaty,
LATIN ARB. L., www.latinarbitrationlaw.com/termination-of-bolivia-united-states
-bilateral-investment-treaty/ (last visited July 4, 2014), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/AMQ9-UHT3 (giving a brief summary of the termination of the
Bolivia–United States BIT).
139. Luke Eric Peterson, Venezuela Surprises the Netherlands with Termination No-
tice for BIT: Treaty Has Been Used by Many Investors to “Route” Investments into
Venezuela, INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (May 16, 2008), www.iareporter.com/articles/
20091001_93, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/C5XF-AAK7.
140. See Bolivia, Plurinational State of, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), supra
note 131; Venezula, Bolivarian Republic of, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs),
UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
IIA.CountryBits/228#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Sept. 26, 2014), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/LM6J-RWA7.
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most theatrically and is by far the furthest along.  In 2008, then rela-
tively new President Rafael Correa, who had denounced the Washing-
ton Consensus in his inaugural address and begun ushering in a
number of new leftist policies, announced he had no faith in ICSID
and further that Ecuador had “handed over its sovereignty” when it
signed the ICSID Convention.141  In the same year, Ecuador de-
nounced its BITs with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, and Uru-
guay.142  The year 2009 witnessed Ecuador’s denunciation of the IC-
SID Convention.143  In March 2013, armed with a decision of the
Ecuadorian Constitutional Court finding the dispute resolution provi-
sions in thirteen additional BITS to be in conflict with a provision of
the state’s 2008 constitution, President Correa announced his inten-
tion to seek termination of the state’s remaining BITs.144  Most re-
cently, in October 2013, Ecuador established a commission to audit
the majority of its BITs.145  If Ecuador stays the course, the state will
eventually make a full exit; nonetheless, it will be many years before
the state is completely free of the obligation to arbitrate investor–state
disputes under its BITs.  Ecuador’s BIT with the Netherlands, for in-
stance, provides for UNCITRAL arbitration, may only be terminated
at ten-year intervals, and contains a fifteen-year continuing effects
clause.146  Assuming Ecuador terminates that BIT when it is next le-
gally able to do so in July 2021, the treaty will remain applicable to
investments made by Dutch investors prior to that date until July
2037.147
141. See Ignacio A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, 16
LAW & BUS. REV. AMERICAS 409, 422 (2010); Gabriela Molina, Ecuador Wary of
World Bank Arbitration in Occidental Case, USA TODAY, May 11, 2008, http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-5-11-3404362337_x.htm,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/HL9M-2UQ7.
142. UNCTAD WIR 2013, supra note 10, at 108 & 201 n.57.
143. See supra note 10.
144. UNCTAD WIR 2013, supra note 10, at 201 n.57; 2011 Investment Climate State-
ment—Ecuador, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 2011), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/
othr/ics/2011/157270.htm, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/V2RB-W4UN.
145. Ecuador Establishes Commission to Audit Its Bilateral Investment Treaties, AL-
LEN & OVERY (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/
Pages/Ecuador-establishes-Commission-to-audit-its-Bilateral-Investment-
Treaties.aspx, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/TXG2-4467.
146. Ecuador–Netherlands BIT, supra note 120, arts. 11, 14.
147. Id.  It has been reported by at least one law firm that Argentina may denounce
the ICSID Convention and that President Cristina Ferna´ndez de Kirchner will
ask Argentina’s Congress to pass a law providing for the termination of the
state’s BITs; if such a law is passed, Argentina would need to embark on the long
road toward full exit behind Ecuador.  Hogan Lovells, If Argentina Withdraws
from the ICSID Convention: Implications for Foreign Investors, INT’L ARB. ALERT
(Feb. 4, 2013), http://ehoganlovells.com/cv/675f9a9cdbacdf1cb602217222c2aaef2d
834bd2, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/KBP8-GKHG.
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President Correa and his policies are very popular in Ecuador but
polemical abroad.  The state is the third most frequent respondent in
investor–state arbitration and has been hit with the largest award to
date in the Occidental Petroleum dispute.148  This is relevant because
it has been suggested that actions such as Ecuador’s do not illustrate
any systemic problem with ICSID arbitration but are instead predi-
cated on individual net cost–benefit analyses (which might differ sig-
nificantly from the net cost–benefit analyses of many other club
members).149  It cannot be said, however, that all states that have em-
barked on the exit road are similarly situated.  South Africa has been
a respondent in all of two known investor–state arbitrations, both of
which it settled, yet recently announced its intention to terminate all
of its “first-generation” BITs, which it concluded following
apartheid.150  The state has terminated five of these treaties so far,
including those with Luxembourg and Belgium, Germany, Spain,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands.151
South Africa embarked on the exit road following the settlement of
its second investor–state arbitration, which was initiated by investors
from Italy and Luxembourg and arose out of the state’s Mining and
Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA).152  The MPRDA is
a component of the state’s Black Economic Empowerment Policy and
requires, among other things, equity in mining companies to be owned
by “Historically Disadvantaged Persons.”153  In response to criticism
of the state’s decision to terminate its first-generation BITs, South Af-
rican Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies issued a letter af-
firming South Africa’s commitment to continue strengthening its
investment protection regime for all investors “in a transparent and
148. IIA Issues Note: Recent Developments, supra note 5, at 1, 4.
149. See Trakman, supra note 134, at 611 (citing Andreas von Staden, Towards
Greater Doctrinal Clarity in Investor–State Arbitration: The CMS, Enron, and
Sempra Annulment Decisions, 2 CZECH Y.B. INT’L L. 207 (2011)).
150. UNCTAD WIR 2013, supra note 10, at 108; Adam Robert Green, South Africa:
Govt. Begins Shedding ‘First Wave’ Investment Treaties, THIS IS AFR. (Oct. 18,
2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201210191188.html, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/RL2G-RUMW.
151. Jonathan Lang, Bilateral Investment Treaties—A Shield or Sword?, BOWMAN GIL-
FILLAN AFR. GROUP, http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/
South-African-Government-Canceling-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties.pdf (last
visited July 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JC2G-QMTL; South Af-
rica, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE &
DEV., http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/195#iiaInnerMenu
(last visited Sept. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/YF2-Y5PH.
152. Piero Foresti v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/07/1, Award (Aug. 4,
2010), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases
RH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1651_En&caseId=C90, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/AHX8-CB6N.
153. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (S. Afr.), archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/8N9-KJ9Q.
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nondiscriminatory manner” rather than provide it only to
“some. . . covered under outdated [BITs]” concluded when investors
were uncertain about the country’s future economic direction.154  Da-
vies also asserted that “[e]vidence the world over has amply demon-
strated that there is no correlation between the investment treaties
and [FDI] flows,” and that “governments around the world have re-
viewed and adjusted their approach to investment treaties” given
their imprecision and imposition on host states of “unacceptable
risks.”155  At a South Africa–EU Business Forum in July 2013, Davies
further referenced a growing trade deficit with the EU, which
prompted Karel De Gucht, the European commissioner for trade, to
defend the trade relationship as “mutually beneficial” and to further
reference an agreement under which the EU had agreed to an asym-
metric opening of agricultural markets to South Africa.156  Canada’s
minister for international trade has similarly decried South Africa’s
decision, calling it an action that “protectionist” countries take and
warning that Canadian investors are a “cautious lot.”157
Finally, Australia has not terminated any of its BITs but an-
nounced in April 2011 it will no longer seek to include investor–state
dispute settlement provisions in its investment agreements.158  Aus-
tralia’s action is less drastic than the actions of Ecuador and South
Africa and is effectively a threat of exit.  It is significant, however, not
only because Australia had never been a respondent in investor–state
arbitration at the time but also, and perhaps more significantly, be-
cause Australia is a significant capital exporter.  In explanation, the
Australian government went beyond the investor–state arbitration is-
sue to state that it supports the principle of national treatment but
not provisions that would: “confer greater legal rights on foreign busi-
nesses than those available to domestic businesses”; constrain Austra-
lia’s ability “to make laws on social, environmental and economic
matters in circumstances where those laws do not discriminate be-
154. Rob Davies, Letter: Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties Won’t Harm Re-
lations, BUS. DAY (July 19, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/
letters/2013/07/19/letter-termination-of-bilateral-investment-treaties-wont-harm
-relations, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/W5WP-ZPWV.
155. Id.
156. Mark Allix, South Africa Gets Tongue-Lashing at SA–EU Business Forum, BUS.
DAY (July 13, 2013, 14:45), http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2013/07/17/
south-africa-gets-tongue-lashing-at-sa-eu-business-forum, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/3BRH-35E8.
157. Adam Green, Canada ‘Very Disappointed’ at South Africa’s Investment Treaty
Termination, THIS IS AFR. (May 30, 2013), http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/
Business/Legal-Bulletin/Canada-very-disappointed-at-South-Africa-s-investment
-treaty-termination, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/HVP2-Y5AH.  Canadian
companies invest quite heavily in South Africa, and Canadian investment in the
South African mining sector, for instance, has grown significantly since 2005. Id.
158. See supra note 95.
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tween domestic and foreign businesses”; or, finally, “limit [Australia’s]
capacity to put health warnings or plain packaging requirements on
tobacco products or its ability to continue the Pharmaceutical Benefits
Scheme.”159  Two months after its announcement but likely antici-
pated for some time, Australia became a respondent in its first-ever
investor–state arbitration, brought by Philip Morris Asia Ltd. under
the 1993 Hong Kong–Australia BIT.160  That dispute, not surpris-
ingly, arose out of Australia’s stringent Tobacco Plain Packaging Act
of 2011; it has been pending for more than three years.161
3. The Operation of Exit
The foregoing illustrates that selective exit is unavailable, and that
a range of rather wieldy partial and total exit options are legally avail-
able to the members of the investment arbitration club.  States may
shift from one investment arbitration product to another, partially
exit by terminating only some of their treaties, or fully exit by termi-
nating all of their treaties.  The first of the three options is the closest
in substance to the economist’s imagined marketplace shift; however,
none of the options operate silently, neatly, or freely in the investment
arbitration context.  A state’s decision to denounce the ICSID Conven-
tion or terminate a BIT is inherently vocal and political, albeit more
politically tenable than treaty terminations in other contexts, given
that the state must provide notice and, realistically, an explanation of
the reasons for its decision.  In short, exit is difficult.  This portends
the power of and need for a commensurate amount of voice.
As a means of spurring organizational recuperation, the effect of
exit is unclear.  It is possible that some arbitration tribunals may pay
greater heed to states’ interests generally as a result of one or more of
the aforementioned acts, but that is impossible to determine or mea-
sure with any degree of reliability.  Any resulting improvement in the
club would come about in a roundabout, subjective way that may not
be immediately recognized.  As a general matter, exit is a less sophis-
ticated means of spurring recuperation than voice.162  To be at all ef-
fective as a recuperative mechanism, it would also seem that exit
must register as a valid and vexing complaint against the club.  The
fragmented nature of the legal regime creates a challenge in this re-
159. See supra note 95.
160. Written Notification of Claim Pursuant to Agreement Between the Government
of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T: DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE 3–15
(June 22, 2011), https://www.dfat.gov.au/foi/downloads/dfat-foi-11-20550.pdf,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/FVD4-TVFQ.
161. Procedural Order No. 7, Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Case No. 2012-12
(Permanent Ct. Arbitration Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showfile.asp?fil_id=2091, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9LM5-RE6G.
162. Weiler, supra note 21, at 2411.
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spect, although at least some of the acts may serve to highlight the
potential for the organization to infringe on matters typically within
the domaine re´serve´ of states.163  Perhaps most significantly, the acts
may help to elevate the level and significance of the debate regarding
the costs and benefits of BITs, which could lead to more balanced and
carefully drafted future treaties.  Threats of exit have certainly been
used as a strategy to increase states’ voice in international organiza-
tions in the past, and acts such as South Africa’s and Australia’s could
operate to increase their bargaining power in the negotiation of new
BITs and IIAs if the states choose that course rather than continuing
on the exit road.164  Indeed, Australia’s newly-elected government
signed a free trade agreement with Korea in April 2014 that contains
an investor–state arbitration provision; the government signed a free
trade agreement with Japan in the same month that does not include
one.165  This suggests that Australia may be willing to use investor-
state arbitration as a bargaining chip in its treaty negotiations.
Finally, another challenge to exit’s potential effectiveness as a re-
cuperative mechanism is that the number of investor–state disputes
has continued to rise even as the rate at which new BITs are con-
cluded has continued to fall.  With respect to the marketplace, Hirsch-
man observed exit may fail to cause revenue loss if a company
acquires new customers as it loses old ones.166  That typically occurs
when a product takes time to reveal its faults.167  That force is some-
what at work in the investment arbitration club, given the investment
arbitration industry developed sometime after the heyday of BIT con-
clusions and is now stronger than ever.  Accordingly, although invest-
ment arbitrators are likely aware of all the acts discussed here, they
may not perceive those acts as a potential sign that the club is in
trouble.  The legal regime’s “sticky” quality is also a factor.168
163. Dolzer, supra note 115.
164. Helfer, supra note 107, at 1583–84.
165. Australia–Korea Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-Kor., ch. 11, § B, Apr. 8, 2014,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/G6TJ-Z6TG. See Simon Lester, Improving In-
vestment Treaties Through Exceptions Provisions: The Australian Example,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (May 14, 2014), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/05/14/
improving-investment-treaties-through-general-exceptions-provisions-the-austra
lian-example/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/VJA4-2TNM (reporting that Aus-
tralia protected its regulatory space through a general exceptions provision). See
also Luke Nottage, Why No Investor–State Arbitration in the Australia–Japan
FTA?, E. ASIA F. (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/04/09/why-
no-investor-state-arbitration-in-the-australia-japan-fta, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/SNF3-WPFP (reporting that Japan, the net capital exporter in the rela-
tionship, presumably did not push very hard for investor–state dispute
settlement).
166. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 26.
167. Id.
168. Salacuse, supra note 48, at 471–72.
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B. Voice: From Protest to Prescription
In contrast to exit, a state’s options to voice its disaffection with the
investment arbitration club are essentially limitless.  A state may,
among other things, express its views in intergovernmental dialogues,
such as the ongoing Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment Freedom of Investment Roundtable discussions, declare on
a talk show that it will not recognize ICSID arbitration awards a` la
the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, or amend or replace its
existing BITs.169  In the investment arbitration area, as illustrated
above, while a state cannot practically exercise any of its limited exit
options without exercising its voice at the same time, the converse is
not true.  A state may “kick up a fuss” while retaining full or partial
membership, and a number of states are doing so.170  This section ex-
amines the availability and operation of three channels for voice in
this context.  As will be shown, the fragmented nature of the legal re-
gime creates both challenges and opportunities in this respect as well.
1. Protest
Perhaps the most obvious way for a state to voice its displeasure
with a legal regime is through noncompliance.  Treaty breach, or “de-
fection” in the language of international relations scholars, is certainly
available to members of the investment arbitration organization and
may be exercised in myriad ways and degrees.171  As discussed here,
the term refers to a state’s failure to comply with its obligations re-
specting investor–state arbitration and not any substantive obliga-
tions assumed in an investment treaty.  This choice is made primarily
because investor–state arbitration is the focus of this Article, but also
because breaches of this nature will be in many cases more visible and
thus more vocal than breaches of other types.  Whether a host state
has breached an obligation to afford fair and equitable treatment, for
example, may be debatable, especially before an arbitral award is ren-
dered, whereas a state’s compliance with its obligation to pay a final
169. OECD has hosted these discussions, on “how governments can reconcile the need
to preserve and expand an open international investment environment with their
duty to safeguard the essential security interests of their people,” since 2006. See
Freedom of Investment Roundtables: Summary of Discussions, OECD, http://
www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/oecdroundtablesonfreedomofinvestment
.htm (last visited July 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5QQS-6MYR?
type=live.  President Chavez made this announcement on January 8, 2012. Cha´-
vez No Aceptara´ los Fallos de un O´rgano Internacional Contra Sus Expropria-
ciones [Chavez Will Not Accept the Rulings of an International Body Against His
Expropriations], BBC NEWS (Jan. 8 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/ultimas_
noticias/2012/01/120108_ultnot_venezuela_chavez_petroleo_exxon_fp.shtml,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/RZ8-YSTV.
170. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 30.
171. See Helfer, supra note 107, at 1614.
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arbitration award will more typically be regarded incontrovertibly.
This is especially true in the case of ICSID awards.  Because an em-
blematic feature of ICSID arbitration is its self-contained nature, a
state’s refusal to voluntarily pay an ICSID award is particularly con-
spicuous and apt to register as a targeted protest of the investor–state
arbitration system, as illustrated below with the example of Argen-
tina.172  As Christoph Schreuer has cogently stated, “[t]he obligation
to abide by and comply with the terms of [an ICSID] award is a logical
consequence of its binding nature.”173
Indeed, while the majority of states that have lost investor–state
disputes have paid the awards, a number have not done so, and the
acts of nonpayment have been widely publicized.174  Russia, Argen-
tina, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Zimbabwe, Congo, Liberia, and Sene-
gal have all declined to voluntarily pay one or more investment
arbitration awards.175  As a practical matter, such refusals can be
very difficult for the award-holding investor to overcome, because a
state’s consent to investment arbitration has generally been inter-
preted as a limited waiver of the state’s jurisdictional sovereign immu-
nity that does not impugn its separate sovereign immunity from
execution; the ICSID Convention states this expressly.176  Accord-
ingly, an investor confronted with a non-paying state is generally left
to seek enforcement against the state’s commercial assets in a munici-
pal court, with uncertain prospects for success.177  Ultimately, a
state’s refusal to voluntarily pay an investment arbitration award cre-
ates a risk that the dispute will be “re-politicized” if the investor’s
172. Article 53 of the ICSID Convention provides that an award “shall be binding on
the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except
those provided in this Convention.”  ICSID Convention, supra note 9, art. 53.  Ar-
ticle 54, in turn, requires each Contracting State to recognize an ICSID award “as
binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations . . . as if it were a final judgment of
[a court] in that State.” Id. art. 54. See also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1,
at 223 (“Proceedings under the ICSID Convention are self-contained. . . .  [They
also] are independent of the intervention of any outside bodies.”).
173. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1106
(2d ed. 2009).
174. Andrea Bjorklund, Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Inves-
tor–State Arbitral Awards: The Re-Politicization of International Investment Dis-
putes, 21 AM. REV. INT’L. ARB. 211, 213 & nn.13–17 (2010). See also Rosenberg,
supra note 94, at 508 & nn.26–31 (listing particular nations who have refused to
comply with ICSID awards).
175. Bjorklund, supra note 174, at 213 n.18.  It should be noted that the majority of
states have voluntarily paid the awards including, notably, Bolivia and Ecuador,
even after they denounced the ICSID Convention. See id. at 214 n.20.
176. See id. at 211. See also ICSID Convention, supra note 9, art. 55 (stating that
nothing in the ICSID will prejudice the law in force in any Contracting State
relating to immunity from execution); Georges R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration
and the Courts, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 784, 797 (1983) (discussing the various methods
and problems available for executing against a state’s assets).
177. See Bjorklund, supra note 174, at 220–23.
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home state chooses to take up the matter.178  This is typically re-
garded as a failure for the legal regime given that one of its chief aims
is the depoliticization of investor–state disputes.179  It illustrates
rather well, however, the availability and operation of voice through
protest in this context.
Of all the refusals to voluntarily pay ICSID awards, Argentina’s
refusals have garnered the most attention, and for very good reason.
Argentina is the most frequent respondent in investor–state arbitra-
tion, having defended itself in at least fifty-two arbitrations as of May
2013.180  The storied tale of Argentina and ICSID spans the state’s
implementation of a suite of measures to address an economic crisis in
2002, a subsequent flood of investment treaty claims based on those
measures, inconsistent arbitral awards on the outcome-determinative
issue of Argentina’s “necessity” defense, and, finally, single awards in
the hundreds of millions of dollars and potential mass liability in the
billions of dollars.181  Against this backdrop, Argentina has taken the
legal position that it is not required to pay adverse ICSID awards un-
til the prevailing foreign investor pursues formal proceedings in an
Argentine court.182  Argentina’s position smacks of protest and has
been widely received as such by the international community.  De-
fenders of ICSID criticize Argentina’s actions as self-calculated and
self-interested; others assert that the tale showcases ICSID’s incompe-
tence in handling investor–state disputes stemming from sovereign
debt crises.183  It is not yet clear how the story will end; however, the
issue is evidently becoming increasingly political over time.  On March
26, 2012, acting on petitions filed by two U.S. companies, President
Obama suspended Argentina’s preferential trade benefits under the
U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which grants non-re-
ciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from
Argentina, on the unprecedented basis that the state “has not acted in
good faith in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of United States citi-
178. See id. at 239–42.
179. See id. at 214, 239–42.
180. IIA Issues Note: Recent Developments, supra note 5, at 4.  Venezuela, with 34
known cases as of May 2013, is the second most frequent respondent. Id. See
also List of Concluded Cases, supra note 3 (listing all concluded cases); List of
Pending Cases, supra note 3 (listing all pending cases).
181. See Eric David Kasenetz, Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: The Af-
termath of Argentina’s State of Necessity and the Current Fight in the ICSID, 41
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 709, 711–31 (2010). See also Trakman, supra note 134,
at 642–43 (noting the inconsistent applications of law in cases involving the ne-
cessity defense).
182. See Rosenberg, supra note 94, at 510–15.
183. Trakman, supra note 134, at 611. See also L. Yves Fortier, International Arbitra-
tion and the Argentine Cases: An Evaluation of 10 Years of Arbitration—Institu-
tional Aspects, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 545, 545 (2012) (questioning the
ability of the ICSID to successfully manage investment disputes).
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zens or a [United States entity].”184  More recently, in October 2013,
Argentina announced it will settle five ICSID awards for $500 million,
a reduction of 25% from the original amount claimed, in government
bonds (not cash).185  While this decision appears to mark a shift in
Argentina’s stance on ICSID awards, Argentina may have taken the
action at least in part to bolster its credibility in other, larger battles
over repayment of its restructured government debt and privately
held bonds.186  In essence, the political fight continues.
2. Interpretation
An altogether different channel for voice is subsequent agreement
and practice.  The VCLT provides that treaty interpretation shall take
into account “any subsequent agreement between the parties regard-
ing the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions”
and “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpreta-
tion.”187  As is well-known to those in the investment treaty field,
NAFTA goes a step beyond the VCLT to provide that subsequent in-
terpretations issued by its Free Trade Commission (FTC), which is
comprised of cabinet-level representatives of the three treaty parties,
are binding on NAFTA tribunals.188  On July 31, 2001, during the
pendency of the damages phase of the Pope & Talbot arbitration
against Canada and the merits phase of the ADF Group arbitration
against the United States, the FTC issued a binding note of interpre-
tation “clarifying” that the concepts of “fair and equitable treatment”
and “full protection and security” contained in NAFTA Section 1105(1)
do not require treatment “in addition to or beyond that which is re-
quired by the customary international law minimum standard of
184. Proclamation No. 8788, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,899 (Mar. 29, 2012). See also VIVIAN C.
JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33663, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES:
BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE 3 (2013) (discussing the implications of Ar-
gentina’s suspension of GSP benefits); Rosenberg, supra note 94, at 510–16 (dis-
cussing Argentina’s failure to comply with ICSID awards).
185. Ken Parks, Argentina Reaches $677M Investment Dispute Settlement—Govern-
ment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20131018-
705467.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/WJB9-PEAE.
186. Two months prior to Argentina’s announcement, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld an injunction barring the state from repaying holders
of its restructured debt if it fails to pay private holders of certain defaulted bonds.
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).  Most recently, in May 2014, Argentina announced it had
reached a deal with the Paris Club to settle its $9.7 billion debt on bonds held by
Paris Club governments.  James K. Glassman, Don’t Welch on Me, Argentina,
WALL ST. J., June 3, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/james-k-glassman-dont-
welch-on-me-argentina-1401826159, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8B6Q-
X8RC?type=live.
187. VCLT, supra note 121, art. 31(3)(a)–(b).
188. NAFTA, supra note 135, arts. 1131(2), 2001(1), 2001(2)(c).
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aliens.”189  The Pope & Talbot tribunal chafed at the interpretation
given its timing but ultimately applied it, as did the ADF Group tribu-
nal and subsequent tribunals.190  The extent to which the specific in-
terpretation issued actually impacted the outcome of the disputes is
debatable, given that the meaning of the customary international law
minimum standard itself is less than clear.  Nonetheless, the mecha-
nism may be regarded as one significant channel for voice in this con-
text.  Criticisms of the mechanism notwithstanding, an investment
arbitration tribunal would be hard-pressed to ignore the FTC’s
interpretation.
To some, the FTC’s interpretation came at a less-than-ideal time
given the pendency of the arbitrations.  That view is understandable,
but it may also reflect some degree of disciplinary tunnel vision, as the
necessary political impetus for the interpretation may not have other-
wise existed, especially in light of the relatively low number of invest-
ment arbitration awards that had been rendered at the time.  The
impetus may exist more broadly now, given the increasingly wide-
spread recognition that the investment arbitration machine is in need
of recalibration, coupled with the difficulty of exit.  Subsequent agree-
ment and practice would therefore seem to be a potentially valuable
channel through which states can exercise increased voice.  Consistent
with the theme of this Article, political motivations should not be dis-
counted automatically; however, it stands to reason that not all in-
stances of subsequent agreement and practice will warrant equal
weight.  Anthea Roberts has recently made excellent arguments as to
how and when states can most effectively conclude subsequent agree-
ments and engage in subsequent practice.191
The FTC illustrates the remarkable power states have to include
similar mechanisms in their treaties and thereby retain a significant
degree of interpretive control over their agents.  To American lawyers,
the power is especially striking for two inter-related reasons: (1) the
law-making and law-interpreting functions reside in separate
branches of government in our system, and (2) domestic courts con-
sider at most a statute’s plain language and legislative history in in-
189. N. Am. Free Trade Comm’n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provi-
sions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 31, 2001), http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/38790.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/D25A-M3YM.
190. See ADF Grp. Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, ¶ 177
(Jan. 9, 2003), 18 ICSID Rev. 195 (2003); Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov’t of Can.,
Award in Respect of Damages, 41 I.L.M. 1347, ¶¶ 11–16 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. 2002). See also United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., IIA Issues
Note: Interpretation of IIAs: What States Can Do, at 13, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/
WEB/DIAE/IA/2011/10 (Dec. 2011), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/LUD7-
26DD (discussing the FTC’s application of 1105(1) to the Pope & Talbot and ADF
Group cases); Yackee, supra note 15, at 441 (noting that tribunals have often
respected FTC interpretive authority).
191. See generally Roberts, supra note 25.
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terpreting a law made by Congress; subsequent interpretations by
Congress are not considered.  With respect to the former, and as Jason
Yackee has noted, the FTC is not analogous to a domestic court or, for
that matter, to any single branch of domestic government.192  With
respect to the latter, it is striking that the VCLT requires, and does
not merely permit, consideration of subsequent agreements and prac-
tice in treaty interpretation.  Quite distinct from the domestic law
principle contained in Marbury v. Madison, this VCLT requirement
stems from the public international law principle that “the right of
giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to
the person or body who has power to modify or suppress it.”193  Ac-
cordingly, treaty parties possess a very powerful tool even in the ab-
sence of a mechanism comparable to NAFTA’s FTC.  The strongest
evidence of subsequent agreements and practice will represent the
views of all parties to a treaty and thus will not always be possible,
but the fragmented nature of the legal regime presents an opportunity
in this respect for the simple reason that it is typically easier for a
smaller number of parties to reach agreement than it is for a larger
number to do so.
3. Prescription
Finally, a third and potentially very powerful channel for voice is
treaty amendment or wholesale replacement.  This requires not only
the assent of all parties, but also domestic ratification, and accord-
ingly entails the most significant transaction costs.  Because amend-
ments and new treaties will go beyond interpretations of existing
provisions, it is also to be expected that reaching agreement may in
some instances be more difficult than reaching agreement on a subse-
quent interpretive agreement.  Again, however, significant opportuni-
ties exist by virtue of the fragmented nature of the legal regime.  By
way of comparison, it is virtually impossible to amend the ICSID Con-
vention because there are 150 parties to it and consensus is required.
Fortunately, in one sense, and as discussed above, the ICSID Conven-
tion is a skeletal instrument which leaves a substantial amount of
room for states to fill in the gaps in their BITs and IIAs.  Of all the
existing channels for voice, treaty amendment or replacement is the
most powerful because it does not operate as a means of controlling an
192. See Yackee, supra note 15, at 441; Joshua Elcombe, Note, Regulatory Powers vs.
Investment Protection Under NAFTA’s Chapter 1110: Metalclad, Methanex, and
Glamis Gold, 68 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 71, 98 (2010).
193. Question of Jaworzina, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 8, at 37 (Dec.
6). See also Kasikili/Zedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J.
1045, ¶ 63 (Dec. 13) (analyzing state practice subsequent to an agreement for an
authoritative interpretation of its terms). But see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is.”).
354 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:313
agent’s exercise of existing authority.  Instead it affirmatively modi-
fies the scope of that authority.
The ways in which new provisions or treaties may differ from ex-
isting ones are also essentially limitless.  Briefly, options related to
the aforementioned possible recuperative goals of mission definition,
adaptation, and cost–benefit balancing will be considered here.  With
respect to mission definition, the lack of a formal international invest-
ment organization comparable to the WTO gives BIT and IIA parties a
remarkable opportunity to define the object and purpose of the club for
their purposes, and to tailor their BITs to their particular circum-
stances and appetites for risk.  For example, if the promotion of sus-
tainable development is a goal, then it is worthwhile for the treaty
parties to state this expressly in their treaty’s statement of object and
purpose.  Related to this, the parties may wish to include denial of
benefits clauses applicable to foreign investors that have no substan-
tial business activity in the host state.194  As is now evident, the risk
of not specifying a treaty’s broader object and purpose is that arbitra-
tion tribunals will interpret it as investment protection in a vacuum,
divorced from any broader economic goals.  A number of recent BITs
are better in this regard than their earlier counterparts.  The pream-
ble to the recently signed Canada–Benin BIT, for example, references
“the stimulation of mutually beneficial economic activity, the develop-
ment of economic cooperation between both countries and the promo-
tion of sustainable development.”195  That language helpfully goes
beyond preambles in earlier Canadian BITs, which reference only “the
stimulation of business initiative and . . . the development of economic
cooperation.”196  Taking the concept a step further to address the rela-
tionship between investment protection and the parties’ other sover-
eign prerogatives, and along the lines of the most recent U.S. Model
BIT, treaty parties could express the object and purpose in terms of
investment promotion and protection “consistent with” their other
objectives—and sovereign prerogatives and responsibilities—includ-
ing sustainable development, adherence to international labor stan-
dards, and the protection of health, safety, and the environment.197
194. See Agreement Between Canada and the Slovak Republic for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Can.-Slovak Republic, art. XV, July 20, 2010, 2010
Can. T.S. No. E105168 [hereinafter Canada–Slovak Republic Agreement].
195. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Re-
public of Benin for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-
Benin, pmbl., Jan. 8, 2013, 2014 Can. T.S. No. E105414 archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/N7YY-TWZS [hereinafter Canada–Benin BIT].
196. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the Republic of Hungary for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, Can.-Hung., pmbl., Oct. 3, 1991, 1993 Can. T.S. No. E101513.
197. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, OFFICE OF THE. U.S. TRADE REPRE-
SENTATIVE, pmbl. (2012) [hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model BIT], http://www.ustr.gov/
2014] EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 355
Second, with respect to adaptation and as mentioned previously,
the global climate for investment—and investment treaties—is much
different than it was in the club’s early days, when capital-exporting
states sought to conclude BITs primarily due to fears of expropriation
and many newly independent but economically undeveloped countries
had a recent history of fiercely guarding their right to expropriate for-
eign investment.198  As investment flows have increased and diversi-
fied and the line between capital-importing and capital-exporting
states has blurred, it is increasingly the case that both parties to a
BIT may have favorable climates for investment, or at least climates
that are significantly improved from the club’s early days.  At the
same time, and in light of the rapid and recent explosion in inves-
tor–state arbitration, both parties—as opposed to one or neither—are
likely to understand that liability is a significant risk and accordingly
be willing to include provisions designed to limit their liability.
One consequence and opportunity presented by these changes is
that both parties may now have a greater interest in clarifying the
substantive treaty standards to make expectations more clear.  At the
front end, clearer standards may reduce the number of investor–state
disputes filed, and at the back end, they may helpfully limit the dis-
cretion of the arbitration tribunals and, in turn, enhance the predict-
ability and consistency of arbitral awards.  The current trend is
towards greater precision, which is encouraging given that precision is
typically associated with more effective legal rules and is particularly
warranted where, as here, the stakes are high and the parties are
risk-adverse.199  One means of making the standards more precise is
by reference to domestic law, where it is sufficiently developed, or to
other appropriate sources of international law.  In the wake of its ex-
periences under NAFTA, for example, the United States amended its
Model BIT in 2004 to provide for indirect expropriation claims to be
decided in accordance with a three-factor test derived from U.S. con-
stitutional law, in particular the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.200  More re-
cently, the United States included more robust notice and comment
requirements for “laws, regulations, procedures and administrative
sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/98L6-BLR2.
198. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 166.
199. See Hafner-Burton, Victor & Lupu, supra note 55, at 74–75.
200. Kurtz, supra note 60, at 81.  To observe this incorporation of United States con-
stitutional law into the Model BIT, see 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Annex B, no.4, http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/117601.pdf (last visited June 26, 2014), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/FQ7P-BGYW, and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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rulings of general applicability” in its 2012 U.S. Model BIT.201  Those
requirements, which include a sixty-day comment period “in most
cases,” an explanation of “the purpose and rationale” for proposed reg-
ulations, and upon promulgation of a final regulation, a response to
“significant, substantive comments” and an explanation of any “sub-
stantive revision” from the proposed regulation, are evidently based
on U.S. administrative law.202  Provisions that may particularly bene-
fit from greater specificity include those providing for fair and equita-
ble treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, and compensation for
expropriation.203
Finally, and related to the foregoing, treaty amendment or replace-
ment presents opportunities to include provisions aimed at managing
both financial and sovereignty risks.  With respect to the former, the
awards rendered to date suggest that treaty parties may wish to seri-
ously consider addressing the subject of remedies.  Most investment
treaties do not limit the remedies that may be fashioned or provide
any guidance on the subject, which has led investment arbitration
tribunals to rely by default on the customary international law princi-
ple, as stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Factory at Chorzo´w Case, that if a state has committed a wrong, it is
liable to make reparations.204  The amount of reparations owed under
customary international law is that sufficient to eliminate the conse-
quences of the illegal act and place the wronged party in the position it
would have been in if the illegal act had never occurred.205  Invest-
ment arbitration tribunals typically award pecuniary remedies, likely
in large part because only the pecuniary aspects of an ICSID awards
are enforceable as if they were a final judgment of the state in which
enforcement is sought.206  The International Court of Justice, how-
ever, has relied on the Factory at Chorzo´w standard in fashioning non-
pecuniary relief such as injunctions and specific performance, and it
201. 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 197, arts. 10–11.
202. See Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236–38 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Compare 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 197, art. 11(2)–(3), with 5 U.S.C.
§§ 553, 556, 557 to observe the incorporation of administrative law standards into
the 2012 Model BIT.
203. See, e.g., Canada–Slovak Republic Agreement, supra note 194, art. III (clarifying
limited scope of fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security pro-
visions); id. Annex A (clarifying meaning of indirect expropriation); Agreement
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the Republic of Colom-
bia and the Republic of India, Colom.-India, art. IV, Nov. 11, 2009, U.N.T.S.
51078, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Z4G8-HGAQ (clarifying that most fa-
vored nation treatment does not extend to dispute settlement, among other
things).
204. See Factory at Chorzo´w (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment No. 13, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
17, at 47 (Sept. 13).
205. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7,
Award (May 25, 2004), 12 ICSID Rep. 3 (2007); Salacuse, supra note 48, at 446.
206. ICSID Convention, supra note 9, art. 54(1).
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has been well-argued that nothing in the ICSID Convention prohibits
ICSID tribunals from doing so.207  Overall, the customary interna-
tional law rule confers a substantial amount of discretion on arbitra-
tion tribunals in fashioning remedies of whatever type and in
whatever amount they deem appropriate.
Of course, the fact that BITs present an opportunity for treaty par-
ties to address remedies does not mean that doing so would be legally
or politically uncomplicated.  With respect to pecuniary remedies, it is
notable that they are not available in many domestic systems for
claims similar to a number of investment treaty claims, such as alle-
gations of arbitrary administrative conduct, and are widely thought to
create the wrong incentive to bring such claims.208  Among other
things, therefore, treaty parties may wish to consider whether the
available remedies for expropriation, for instance, should differ from
the available remedies for other claims.  Regarding the domestic law
analogy, however, it is also important that arbitration tribunals do not
occupy a position equal to domestic courts that perform administra-
tive or constitutional judicial review, and arguably should not be en-
couraged to fashion remedies that are the normal province of those
courts.209  The United States’ practice of limiting available remedies
to money damages and restitution, and prohibiting punitive damages,
appears to reflect this view.210  The remedy question is thus difficult,
but silence on the subject operates to shift it entirely to the arbitration
tribunals.  The suggestion made here is that treaty parties should at
least consider a different choice as they move forward, given what is
now known about the potential magnitude and impact of investment
arbitration awards.  In addition to, or in lieu of, language on the avail-
ability of specific remedies, treaty parties may wish to consider includ-
ing language on the objectives of investor–state dispute settlement
and the role of investment arbitration tribunals.  Again, a possible
source of guidance is the DSU, which provides, among other things,
that the objectives of dispute settlement include obtaining a “positive
solution to a dispute” and that a “solution mutually acceptable to the
parties and consistent with [the law]” is “clearly to be preferred.”211
Language to this effect would shift the remedy focus away from en-
forceability and compensation towards mutual acceptability.
207. See Christoph Schreuer, Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration, 20 ARB.
INT’L 325, 331 (2004).
208. See Anne van Aaken, Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Invest-
ment Law and National State Liability, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, supra note 15, at 721, 730.
209. See Katselas, supra note 15, at 146–47.
210. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 135, art. 1135; 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note
197, art. 34.
211. DSU, supra note 79, art. 3(7).
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With respect to managing sovereignty risks, the language on the
treaty’s object and purpose may go a long way.  In particular, treaty
parties should consider specifying that the object and purpose is in-
vestment promotion and protection “consistent with” their other objec-
tives and responsibilities.  In addition, treaty parties have
opportunities to specify that health, safety, and environmental mea-
sures should not be relaxed to encourage investment, and to include
carve-outs for new health, safety, and environmental measures along
the lines of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.212  Both are increasingly being included in BITs, and Canada’s
recently signed BIT with Benin, for example, includes both provi-
sions.213  Carve-outs are not a perfect solution, as WTO practice illus-
trates, but they may helpfully inform and limit the meaning of a BIT’s
imprecise substantive standards.214  On this point, it is useful to point
out that, while the international investment regime is “fragmented” in
the sense that it consists of thousands of treaties, it might also be ar-
gued that its specialized subject matter is problematic because it con-
tributes to the “fragmentation” of international law.  For those
concerned about the latter type of fragmentation, one fear is that spe-
cialized treaty regimes may obscure the relevance and applicability of
other areas of law as well as general principles of international law.215
To at least some extent, provisions that make clear that the protec-
tions afforded in BITs do not displace or supersede the parties’ other
legal obligations or sovereign prerogatives may serve a useful “defrag-
mentation” purpose.
4. The Operation of Voice
The foregoing is far from an exhaustive list of the available chan-
nels for voice in the investment arbitration club.216  It is meant to il-
lustrate that the options are numerous, diverse, and in some cases
212. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, incorporated by reference into General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187.
213. Canada–Benin BIT, supra note 195, art. 15.
214. See, e.g., Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A
Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 739
(2001) (analyzing the effect of such carve-outs in WTO practice).
215. See Rep. of the Study Grp. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of Interna-
tional Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of Inter-
national Law, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi); John F. Coyle, The
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 302, 346–47 (2013).
216. For a discussion of additional channels, including state–state arbitration and
renvoi provisions, viewed from a different perspective, see generally Wolfgang Al-
schner, The Return of the Home State and the Rise of ‘Embedded’ Investor–State
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extremely powerful.  States may, among other things, protest the or-
ganization, clarify the rules (for their purposes) through subsequent
agreements and practice, or change the rules (for their purposes)
through new or amended treaties.  The latter two options are unique
and significant because they do not readily exist in multilateral orga-
nizations where changing the rules is extremely difficult and the most
powerful voice option is typically the veto.  This can prevent change or
spur conversations about needed change, but not effectuate it di-
rectly.217  As an example, decision-making under the WTO Agreement
requires consensus.218  Amendment of the ICSID Convention simi-
larly requires consensus, but, as noted above, the ICSID Convention is
a skeletal instrument that grants significant discretion to the con-
tracting states to fill in the many gaps in, e.g., their BITs.
The latter two options are also significant because they represent a
marriage of sorts between politics and law, in that states would not be
“kicking up a fuss” a` la Ralph Nader, or protesting the law, but rather
refining or changing the law by directly interpreting or modifying the
legal rules.  Quite simply, states have a power as principals that
Ralph Nader does not have, and while the occasional vigorous protest
may be invigorating and highlight the need for change, too much pro-
test, i.e., too many instances of states ignoring arbitral awards, would
quickly render the club ineffective because it would become incapable
of settling investor–state disputes.219  Thus, while channels for voice
clearly exist at both the law-making and law-applying stages, states
should be encouraged to utilize the former, which are more powerful
and specific, and in turn, more likely to bring about the specific
changes sought as well as a more balanced organization.
One possible concern with respect to the prospect of more detailed
treaties is that the variation among them, and in turn, among arbitral
awards, may increase.220  The implication would be that the increase
in treaty diversity would hinder the development of an overarching
legal framework for international investment and a system of prece-
dent in investment arbitration, which some view as necessary for the
regime’s legitimacy.221  It would seem an easy choice, however, be-
Arbitration, in THE STATE AND INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION (Shaheeza Lalani &
Rodrigo Polanco eds., forthcoming 2014).
217. See Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 5; Weiler, supra note 21, at 2473.
218. See WTO Agreement, supra note 76, art. IX(1); Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 26.
219. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 25; Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 33–34.
220. Inconsistency among arbitral awards is commonly cited as a problem. See Susan
D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment
Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 47, 49–50 (2005).
221. See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 15, at 299; Christoph Schreuer &
Matthew Weiniger, Conversations Across Cases—Is There a Doctrine of Precedent
in Investment Arbitration?, 5 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., May 2008, at 3, 8–18
(2008).
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tween “consistent” awards that do not accurately reflect the treaty
parties’ intent and a body of law that better reflects that intent but
does not lend itself to becoming a tidy jurisprudence.222  Further, it is
relevant that the many members of the investment arbitration club
have never agreed on one multilateral treaty and additionally that the
costs and benefits of club membership are not equal.  To date, there is
no central entity to address these distributional issues.  Accordingly, if
the treaty parties do not address issues such as their specific circum-
stances, relationships, and appetites for risk, for example, in their
BITs, then there is a significant risk that the arbitral tribunals will
not consider these issues when interpreting the BITs.  Thus, while the
fragmented legal regime gives rise to opportunities for voice that do
not exist elsewhere, those opportunities arguably come with greater
responsibility on the part of the treaty parties to exercise that voice.
Finally, it is worth considering whether the thousands of treaties
might be regarded as an opportunity rather than an obstacle.  A mul-
titude of treaties creates an opportunity for states to tailor the rules of
the game to their particular circumstances and appetites for risk, and
even to experiment with provisions that would not be possible in a
multilateral framework.  As mentioned above, the club is currently in
the midst of a teenager’s crisis.  It is finding its voice and identity
through experimentation but is not yet ready to be treated as an
adult.  Few, if any, would dispute that the system is in need of reform.
As Franklin D. Roosevelt said of the United States in the 1930s, per-
haps the system could benefit from “bold . . . experimentation.  It is
common sense to take a method and try it: If it fails, admit it frankly
and try another.  But above all, try something.”223
C. The Interplay of Exit and Voice, and the Question of
Loyalty
1. The Interplay and Relative Effectiveness of Exit and Voice
Where, as here, both exit and voice are available to members of an
organization, Hirschman opined that the two principal determinants
of whether voice will be chosen over exit include: (1) the extent to
which members are willing to trade off the certainty of exit against the
uncertainties of the organization’s future improvement, and (2) the es-
timate members have of their ability to influence the organization.224
The primary difficulties for the investment arbitration club are
that it is not clear that BITs lead to an increase in inward foreign
222. See Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 418, 420–21 (2013).
223. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Address at Oglethorpe University (May 22, 1932),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/SB2A-ZXEE.
224. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 77.
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investment, and their financial and sovereignty costs are potentially
very high.  Accordingly, future improvement is very much an open
question, not only in terms of its possibility, but also more fundamen-
tally in terms of its nature and character.  This would seem to be a
distressing state of affairs for the prospect that states will decide to
take up voice, except that exit, as illustrated above, is not readily
available for states that have concluded BITs.  Moreover, and more
positively, BITs still appear to be a factor in a favorable investment
climate, and the recognition that the costs and benefits of club mem-
bership need to be balanced appears to be on the rise.225  Finally, due
to the regime’s fragmented nature and lack of a centralized multilat-
eral body akin to the WTO, the opportunities for voice and the ability
of states to influence the organization for their purposes are very high.
Ultimately, while states originally signed up for a low exit and low
voice club that is unsustainable, that club appears to lend itself rather
well to a low exit and high voice makeover.  Of course, the combination
of low exit and high voice is strongly preferred by international law-
yers to the converse.226
The significance of exit should not be minimized, however, given
that a number of states have taken some real steps toward a formal
exit from the club that are legally difficult, public, and that would be
politically untenable in other international organizations.  Given that
states sometimes use exit, or threats thereof, as a strategy to increase
their voice in international organizations, it is possible that some
states are using exit as a strategic tool in this context as well.227  It
appears that others, however, have determined that the costs of mem-
bership exceed the benefits by too much and that voice is not likely to
bring about a workable balance in a reasonable timeframe.  Notably,
exit and threats of exit have occurred by states with varying levels of
power and influence in the club.  These actions support the conclusion
that the pressure on the exit side of the scale is presently too high.
Fortunately, voice can lead to more sophisticated processes for self-
correction than exit and should accordingly be encouraged over exit in
order to rectify the imbalance.228
2. The Question and Role of Member Loyalty
In addition to the relative difficulty of exit, it is possible that some
states are retaining their memberships due in part to some degree of
attachment, or loyalty, to the club.  Where, as here, both exit and voice
225. See Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 178–82.
226. See Alvarez, supra note 35, at 343 (“The push to enhance ‘voice’ is so insistent
precisely because international lawyers have been relatively successful in dis-
couraging ‘exit.’ ”).
227. See Helfer, supra note 107, at 1583–84.
228. See Weiler, supra note 21, at 2411.
362 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:313
are available, loyalty functions to hold exit at bay for a finite period of
time and is important in many cases because it neutralizes, within
limits, the tendency of the most quality-conscious members of an or-
ganization to be the first to exit.229  Loyalty is unlike faith in that it
“retains an enormous dose of reasoned calculation.”230
The states most likely to feel some semblance of loyalty to the in-
vestment arbitration club would appear to be those that stand the
most to gain and the least to lose from membership.  That group ap-
pears to be the large capital exporters that feel the greatest need to
protect their nationals’ foreign investments through investment trea-
ties and have the least risk of liability under them.
Loyalty is particularly difficult to gauge in the investment arbitra-
tion club due to its fragmented nature and the difficulty of exit.  It
would appear, though, that states which are actively seeking to retain
their existing investment arbitration treaty partners, whether
through original or replacement treaties, and recruit new ones are
more plausibly loyal members of the club than other states.  It would
also appear that only those states that are doing so after experience as
a respondent in investment treaty arbitration can be said to have had
their loyalty tested at all.  Given the lag between the heyday of BIT
conclusions and the gearing-up of the investment arbitration industry,
the total number of investment treaties a state has concluded may not
necessarily reflect its loyalty to the club today.  The state may have
concluded most or all of its treaties prior to the surge of investment
treaty claims or may regard its particular risk to be low, or both.
In any event, the state may have determined that it has more to
gain and less to lose from seeking to reduce its risk from within the
club than from the outside.  The Czech Republic is a notable example.
The state concluded many investment treaties in the 1990s, and
though it has not denounced the regime completely, it has embraced
the European Commission’s position that intra-EU bilateral invest-
ment treaties are inconsistent with EU law.  As a result, it has em-
barked on a path to terminate those treaties.231  The Czech Republic
will of course be bound by any investment treaties the EU concludes,
but it will eventually, if fully successful in this course of action, elimi-
nate the very real risk of claims by investors from other EU coun-
tries.232  Notably, the state is terminating its intra-EU investment
229. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 79.
230. Id.
231. MINISTRY OF FIN. OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, THE CZECH REPUBLIC’S EXPERIENCE
WITH BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (BITS) 6–7 (2013), http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/DOWNLOAD15-Czech%20Rep.-Experi-
ence%20with%20BITs.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/MFP5-VQ5A
[hereinafter CZECH REPUBLIC BIT ANALYSIS].
232. The Czech Republic has defended itself repeatedly against such claims. See
CECILIA OLIVET, A TEST FOR EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY 3, 5–6 (2013), http://www.
2014] EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 363
treaties through mutual agreements which provide for abrogation of
the treaties’ continuing effects clauses, something it could not accom-
plish through unilateral termination.233
Recently, Lauge Poulsen and Emma Aisbett found that developing
countries’ rates of concluding BITs dropped precipitously after a first
investment treaty claim.234  Because the benefits of club membership
are more readily apparent for developed countries, they may be less
sensitive to a single treaty claim.  It is also possible that at least some
developing states are less sensitive to the costs of membership, but
more sensitive to the quality of the benefits they are receiving, than
their developing counterparts.  Notwithstanding these possibilities,
many developed countries may also be in a “hold” pattern.  The United
States has not signed a new bilateral investment treaty since 2008,
and its model treaties have, over time, increasingly strengthened the
protections afforded to host states while circumscribing the protec-
tions afforded to foreign investors.235  Jose Alvarez remarked in 2011,
for instance, that it was difficult to determine what the object and pur-
pose of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT was, given that it was double the
length of its predecessor, shrunk virtually every standard of invest-
ment protection, and expanded the discretion afforded to host
states.236  The 2012 Model BIT goes even further in this direction.
Ultimately, a state’s active efforts to amend its existing treaties or
otherwise limit its litigation risk do not, without more, necessarily sig-
nify loyalty.  The state may have merely weighed its options, including
exit, and chosen the one in its best interest.  Again, active retention
and recruitment efforts appear to be significant in assessing a mem-
ber’s potential loyalty to the club, particularly following experience as
a respondent.
Application of the above two criteria yields a fairly small number of
potentially loyal investment arbitration club members.  As mentioned
previously, the rate of new treaty conclusions has declined signifi-
cantly overall in recent years, likely due in part to some level of satu-
ration and a trend away from bilateral investment treaties in favor of
tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/briefing_on_intra-eu_bits_0.pdf,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3LQR-SWXN.
233. See CZECH REPUBLIC BIT ANALYSIS, supra note 231, at 7.
234. See Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits: Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning, 65 WORLD POL. 273
(2013).
235. The United States most recently signed a bilateral investment treaty with
Rwanda in 2008, which was ratified in 2012. United States of America, Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs), UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV, http://invest
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/223#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Sept.
26, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/H4XG-AJQL [hereinafter U.S. BITs
List].
236. See Jose´ E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223, 235–36
(2011).
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regional trade and investment agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), both of which are under negotiation.237  Aside
from those considerable caveats, Canada, China, and India are among
the states that have concluded the most investment treaties within
the past five years (each, according to UNCTAD, has signed at least
nine and ratified at least four).  Of these states, Canada is the only
one that has been doing so following experience as a respondent.238
Another potentially loyal entity, however, is the EU.  Canada and the
EU have each learned through experience that they are not immune
to investment treaty claims—with the caveat that only some of the
EU’s Member States have been respondents—and appear to remain
committed to investor–state arbitration, at least in some cases.  Be-
cause these entities may be among the critical quality-conscious club
members, the remainder of this section considers their recent practice.
In short, both Canada and the EU are exercising their voice to
move away from first generation BITs to more balanced treaties.  As
discussed previously, Canada has been a respondent in NAFTA arbi-
trations, has revised and narrowed its original investment treaty pro-
visions, and has continued to pursue and conclude new investment
treaties.239  By comparison, the United States has been less active in
237. See United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., IIA Issues Note: Towards a New
Generation of International Investment Policies: UNCTAD’s Fresh Approach to
Multilateral Investment Policy-Making, at 5, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/
PCB/2013/6 (July 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/N5DS-9ZBB. See also
White House Fact Sheet: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-
TIP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT (June 2013),
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/june/wh-ttip, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/5XH4-BL95 (announcing the launch of the T-TIP).
238. Canada, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE
& DEV, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/35#iiaInnerMenu
(last visited Sept. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5YMH-VXZU.
China has been named as a respondent in one ICSID arbitration, but it settled
within two months. See Ekran Berhad v. People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case
No. ARB/11/15 (May 16, 2013), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontSer-
vlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConcluded, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/P8XN-ZXBJ; (Shaun) Zuang-Hui Wu, International Arbitration
for Chinese-Foreign Disputes: Emerging Choices in 2012, INT’L L. NEWS, Spring
2012, at 1, 8, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/HT66-ELEQ.  India suffered its
first-known adverse investment arbitration ruling in November, 2011, and has
not signed a new investment treaty since.  It accordingly remains to be seen
whether, and if so how, its treaty practice will change. See Prabhash Ranjan, The
White Industries Arbitration: Implications for India’s Investment Treaty Pro-
gram, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Apr. 2012, at 13, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/7534-VTUE; India, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), UNITED
NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/
CountryBits/96#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Sept. 26, 2014), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/BQ4D-4EB9.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 189–98 See also Canada, Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs), supra note 238 (listing the countries with which Canada has con-
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concluding new treaties following its experiences under NAFTA.240
Canada has also been a vocal critic of South Africa’s plans to termi-
nate some of its BITs, and has recently ratified the ICSID Conven-
tion—nearly seven years after signing it.241
The EU may be in the best position to appreciate both the potential
costs and benefits of investment arbitration, given that it is the
world’s largest trading bloc and a significant exporter and importer of
capital.242  Since acquiring exclusive competence to negotiate and con-
clude investment agreements for EU Member States under the Lisbon
Treaty, it has supported investor–state arbitration in principle but
has also stressed the need for reform.243  The European Commission
seeks to gradually replace all of the EU Member States’ approximately
1,400 investment treaties with EU agreements and has recently is-
sued a policy statement reaffirming its belief in the value of inves-
tor–state dispute settlement but stressing the need to strengthen the
system’s integrity and to strike a better balance between the right of
host states to regulate and the protection of foreign investors.244
More specifically, the European Commission has expressed its support
for treaty provisions that: (1) reaffirm the right of host states to regu-
late; (2) clarify the scope and meaning of indirect expropriation and
fair and equitable treatment; (3) prohibit frivolous claims; and (4) re-
quire increased transparency in arbitral proceedings.245  According to
Karel De Gucht, the EU is interested in obtaining investor–state dis-
pute settlement in agreements with China, Myanmar, and many other
countries; De Gucht has expressed support for the provisions when
they are new or rewritten, transparent, provide for appellate review,
permit the refusal of arbitrators, and require the foreign investor to
cluded new BITs between 2010 and 2013 as Benin, China, Kuwait, Latvia,
Slovakia, and the United Republic of Tanzania).
240. U.S. BITs List, supra note 235 (showing the conclusion of only two new invest-
ment treaties since 2000, and none since 2009).
241. See supra text accompanying note 157 (regarding Canada’s outcry against South
Africa’s plans). See also supra text accompanying note 87 (regarding Canada’s
ratification of the ICSID Convention).
242. See Directorate-Gen. for Trade of the Eur. Comm’n, Investment, EUR. COMMISSION
(June 11, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/investment/,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/W2U2-N97Z.
243. See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 10, art. 207(1); EUR. COMM’N, FACT SHEET: IN-
VESTMENT PROTECTION AND INVESTOR-TO-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN EU
AGREEMENTS(2013),http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_
151916.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/FRK4-JS9M [hereinafter EUROPEAN
COMMISSION FACT SHEET]. See also Youri Devuyst, European Union Law and
Practice in the Negotiation and Conclusion of International Trade Agreements, 12
J. INT’L BUS. & L. 259, 265–67 (2013) (describing how the Lisbon Treaty vests the
competency to negotiate and conclude investment agreements of all EU Member
States exclusively in the EU).
244. EUROPEAN COMMISSION FACT SHEET, supra note 243, at 1.
245. See id. at 2.
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have a sufficient connection to the host state.246  The EU has, how-
ever, expressed concern about the inclusion of investor–state dispute
settlement in the TTIP and has opened up a period of public consulta-
tion on the issue.247
Large capital exporters are still effectively calling the shots in the
investment arbitration club because their treaty partners often accept
their model treaties without significant modifications.  Many find this
state of affairs troubling.  As the members most committed to the club,
however, these states and entities may be the only ones that will take
up the laboring oar in spurring needed recuperation and reform.  On
this point, it is in some sense a positive that the line between capital-
importing and capital-exporting states has blurred since the club was
formed, and that the states leading the reform efforts have not, as
they originally might have thought, proven immune to investment ar-
bitration risk.
As these states move forward into the club’s next chapter, they will
need to convince less loyal members to retain their memberships and
will likely also seek to recruit new members.  This is perhaps most
evident in the case of the EU, given its ambitious plan to replace all of
its Member States’ existing investment treaties.  Again, it is a positive
from a certain standpoint that the fervor which occurred in the wake
of the Washington Consensus has dissipated, and that capital-import-
ing states are no longer scrambling to conclude BITs as they did in the
club’s early days.  The club’s champions are in a different and more
competitive position than they were then, and they will have to step
up their membership pitch as a result.  The conversation between
South African and Canadian officials discussed previously is one ex-
ample of a conversation that does not appear to have occurred before
many early BITs were concluded.  Such conversations could contribute
to more balanced and carefully drafted future treaties.  With respect
to world trade, Pauwelyn argued that the WTO must “play out its
strongest card: that genuine free trade benefits the masses, not the
few.”248  In the absence of a multilateral investment arbitration en-
tity, the “leaders” of the investment arbitration club will need to
champion the cause that investment protection and promotion will
likewise benefit the masses, not the few, and further that investment
246. Monika Ermert, TTIP: EU Commissioner Points Finger at US Secrecy, Inves-
tor–State Provisions, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 2, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://www.ip
-watch.org/2014/04/02/ttip-eu-commissioner-points-finger-at-us-secrecy-investor-
state-provisions/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/S246-ZUBP.
247. William New, US Defends Investor–State Provisions; EU Promotes TTIP Consul-
tation, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 27, 2014, 10:42 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/
2014/03/27/us-eu-defends-investor-state-provisions-eu-promotes-ttip-
consultation/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/RRE2-BLYE.
248. Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 57.
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arbitration is an important component of such protection and promo-
tion.  Their task is not an easy one.
The existence of a “public good dimension” to club membership
would operate to increase and broaden member loyalty and, in turn,
the prospects for voice, because it would effectively make a complete
exit from the organization impossible.249  A “public good” is defined as
one that is consumed by all members of a given community in a man-
ner such that consumption by one does not detract from consumption
by another.250  Examples include advanced standards of literacy and
public health.251  The designation is important in economics because
public goods are market failures, in that the inability to make the con-
sumption excludable weakens the incentive for private provision.252
On the national level, governments often step in to provide these
goods, but the provision of “global public goods” at the international
level is generally regarded as more difficult due to a lack of effective
international governance.253
Barnali Choudhury recently argued that the system of interna-
tional investment law provides two public good benefits: (1) “an over-
arching framework that guides foreign investment and enhances its
stability and predictability,” and (2) “a vehicle that helps foster a
state’s economic development.”254  In Choudhury’s view, international
investment law produces, among other things, a framework that effi-
ciently facilitates the transfer of capital between states, and it is not
possible to exclude non-participating states from this benefit.255  This
illustrates that the public good inquiry is not straightforward and fur-
ther that the most obvious public good in need of international govern-
ance in this context is probably international investment itself.
Putting the question to the club considered here, however, the in-
quiry becomes whether it is possible for states to escape the “output”
of the investment arbitration club.256  Although it requires a long
journey, it is certainly possible for states to eventually free themselves
of the obligation to arbitrate investment treaty disputes and of the
ultimate obligation to recognize the awards.  The organization would
continue to arbitrate other investment treaty disputes, but it is not
clear that the exiting states would be unable to escape that particular
output, or any other output of the organization.
249. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 102.
250. See id. at 101.
251. See id.
252. See David Gartner, Global Public Goods and Global Health, 22 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 303, 304 (2012).
253. See id. at 305.
254. See Choudhury, supra note 48, at 504.
255. See id.
256. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 101–02.
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According to Choudhury, the fact that arbitration tribunals con-
sistently cite earlier awards signals the “wider applicability” of the
awards and, in turn, supports the conclusion that international in-
vestment law has attained the status of a system.257  Some have gone
further to argue that aspects of international investment law have at-
tained the status of customary international law; others disagree.258
It is certainly true that states cannot escape a world in which inves-
tor–state arbitration occurs.  It is not clear that this is a fact generat-
ing any loyalty, however, particularly in light of the competitive
motivations underlying the conclusion of many BITs.  Regardless of
whether one accepts Guzman’s prisoner’s dilemma theory, BITs are
typically concluded—and investor–state arbitration afforded—in or-
der to promote and protect investments.  If a state opts out of the pro-
motion and protection through this mechanism, it is not clear that it
would retain an inevitable attachment to the organization that contin-
ues to promote and protect other states’ investments.  An argument
could certainly be made that, for competitive reasons, the state would
instead seek to discredit the organization or at least diminish its im-
portance.  In addition, the state might even seek to promote or create
an alternative.  This distinguishes investment treaty arbitration from
public goods such as literacy and public health, from which a member
of the broader society really cannot escape.
Even more broadly, states cannot escape a globalized world, and
the transfer of capital has many potential benefits that are now widely
recognized.  Accordingly, it is possible that some states may feel an
attachment to the organization akin to loyalty for this reason, though
as discussed above, the fragmented nature of the legal regime likely
presents a challenge in this respect.  The investment arbitration club
lacks a clear locus, and furthermore has a short and not altogether
positive history.  Moreover, it is not the only means through which
foreign investment may be protected and promoted; whether it is the
best means is a different and open question.  The organization is not,
in other words, presently synonymous with increased foreign invest-
ment or, more significantly, with increased economic development.  As
such, it does not appear that a public good dimension effectively fore-
closes the exit option, at least not at the present time.  Accordingly,
the aforementioned “leaders” of the club will need to continue to cham-
pion its recuperation for the time being.
257. See Choudhury, supra note 48, at 493.
258. See Patrick Dumberry, Are BITs Representing the “New” Customary International
Law in International Investment Law?, 28 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 675, 676 (2010)
(arguing in the affirmative). But see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL EC-
ONOMIC LAW 584 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing in the negative); Stephen M. Schwebel,
The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary International Law,
98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 27, 28–30 (2004) (same).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Recently, Leon Trakman defended ICSID largely on the ground
that it is merely “the supplicant of its signatories.  The ICSID did not
create itself, but rather member states created it.”259  He is correct, of
course, and it follows that states can modify or terminate ICSID.
They can also spur numerous reforms that do not require consensus or
even a majority ICSID vote.
Exit and voice are both at work in the investment arbitration club,
as they are in most, if not all, “organizations.”  Of all the scenarios
considered by Hirschman, the most analogous appears to be the prod-
uct that reveals its faults only through time.260  There was a lag be-
tween the heyday of BIT conclusions and the widespread use of
investment treaty arbitration by foreign investors.  This in large part
explains the delay in states’ demand for voice commensurate with the
high price of exit.  To return to this Article’s introduction, it is appar-
ent that Paulsson was correct in his assessment that states did not
appreciate the full implications of the obligations they assumed when
they concluded early BITs.261  Accordingly, they did not tread care-
fully in a gradual transition from high exit and low voice to low exit
and high voice.  Instead, they rapidly relinquished significant exit op-
tions without a commensurate increase in voice when they rushed to
join their new and popular club.  The club was not ready for the
growth spurt it experienced and now finds itself in a delayed but acute
teenager’s crisis.
The available options to correct the imbalance are a relaxing of the
burden of exiting, an increase in opportunities for voice, or some com-
bination of the two.  The fragmented nature of the legal regime both
complicates the limited exit options that remain and creates opportu-
nities for meaningful voice that do not exist in formal multilateral or-
ganizations, where veto power is the most powerful voice option.
Here, states are not limited to blocking change.  They can directly ef-
fectuate it and can further prescribe its content.  It is to be expected
that the club’s members with the most to gain will take the lead in
spurring change, and as they do, they are encouraged to have more
robust conversations with their current and prospective treaty part-
ners about the costs and benefits of club membership that may lead to
more balanced and carefully drafted future treaties.  Little by little,
these conversations and other exercises of voice may help to bring
about a better balance between exit and voice, law and politics, and
efficiency and supportability.  If the club is to survive, a better balance
must be struck.
259. Trakman, supra note 134, at 664.
260. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 26.
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